BOOK FIVE

BETRAYAL AND SURVIVAL
As the Great War had ended for all practical purposes, so also had the invective of the Vice President. He was nearing sixty-five, certainly far from senility (a condition he never seems to have had) and yet needful of frequent rest. The President, two years younger, appeared outwardly to be running on endless energy. He had a vision: to see the United States in harmony with the other nations which by "covenant" would swear to work together to maintain peace and concord throughout the earth. The figure was biblical, right out of the Old Testament, referring to the contractual relationship between Israel and her God and between the Israelite tribes themselves. To insure the birth of this league of nations Wilson decided he must personally attend the Peace Conference in Paris. His decision "leaked" to the press before the President had a chance to inform the Congress in joint session on 2 December 1918.

I

Marshall was at the Copley-Plaza Hotel in Boston when a reporter telephoned him to ask his opinion regarding remarks made earlier that evening by George W. Wickersham, former Attorney General under Taft. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, Wickersham had spoken about the supposed new status of the Vice President once the President went outside the country, in this case, to Europe. Wilson allegedly would not be able to function domestically as President, and his duties
would devolve to the second in command as directed by the United States Constitution. Confronted with this bold new thought, Marshall held his words momentarily until he could soberly assess Wickersham's viewpoint and give an answer expedient to the circumstances. Drawing upon his legal knowledge, he stated "definitely and positively" that he would not on his own "take over" the President's duties regardless of whether a legal question arose concerning his signing a legislative bill. He would not commit himself to answering what he would do if Congress resolved that he be "set in motion" as Acting President. He did commit himself that he "unquestionably would assume the Presidency of the United States [should] a court having jurisdiction" so direct him. In an interview to a newspaper reporter Marshall declared: "It is the duty of every American citizen to obey the judgments of courts, and I would obey them, not because I want to, but, as a law-abiding citizen, would feel compelled to do so. I hope the controversy will be stopped, as I have not the slightest desire nor intention on interfering with the President, unless I am forced to, and that will be of infinite regret to me."

The Vice President tried to be both honest and cautious. He did not want anyone--Chief Executive or private citizen--to interpret his words as in any way being in opposition to President's Wilson's leaving the country for the Peace Conference, and he certainly did not wish people to think that he coveted the Presidency, a very delicate question. He believed that his relations with Wilson were "extremely warm and friendly and cordial" and he wanted them to stay that way. He had not been, he said, a part of any discussion debating or challenging the President's right to go abroad. If the President wanted to go, he should go.
Marshall concluded the interview by saying, "I am most reluctant to become involved in any academic discussion of the constitutional or other questions involved, because I am fearful that my participation in such a discussion might give the President the impression that I am in some way opposing his going. I am not. Furthermore, as I said, I have not studied these questions for the reason that I did not anticipate anything arising which would force them upon me."

The President's decision to leave for Europe caught Marshall by surprise. He had no idea that the absence of the President would call for his continued presence in Washington. He was preparing to cross the country on a speaking tour for the League to Enforce Peace with the blessing of William Howard Taft, the League president. This organization was supported by concerned Republicans and Democrats and in principle was akin to Wilson's later idea of a League of Nations whose purpose was to facilitate international arbitration. Marshall told the New York Times about his proposed tour, which was planned before anything had been said about the President's departure, "thus disposing of Washington gossip to the effect that the journey had been devised purposely, to keep the Vice President away from the capital during Wilson's own absence."

Marshall still was going west unless something official kept him in Washington. 1

The newspapers on 27 November carried the story that the President would sail on the George Washington for a month's stay in Europe before attending the opening of the Peace Conference. It seemed ironic that Wilson was to sail on an ex-German army transport ship to a series of meetings in which the German nation would suffer further expropriations. It was more ironic that his ship carried the name of the first President of
the United States who had been a strong advocate of non-involvement with European political affairs.

As soon as the public learned of President Wilson's plan to leave the country, New York lawyers and Washington luminaries expressed their views and seemed happy to do so, there were so many quoted. Louis Marshall and Samuel Untermyer saw no constitutional problems. Archibald Watson, also of New York, spoke with certainty, citing a 1790 law that placed the District of Columbia as the seat of the United States Government, effective December, 1800. Hence, concluded Watson, President Wilson ceases to be president once he lands on foreign shores. Of course, Watson never once considered Maryland or Virginia "foreign shores," but others did!

Previous Presidents had been outside the continent, to say nothing of their being outside the District of Columbia. Both Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft functioned as President while visiting Panama. No one nor Congress had challenged them or any other President a propos of the 1790 law. Several members of Congress saw no problems at all in the President's absence from the country, since they believed him constitutionally able to pass or veto bills abroad. Meanwhile, Republicans in both the House and the Senate felt that the President could function as President anywhere in the world, but they agreed that Wilson was needed at home at this time.

In Boston and away from the hub of controversy, Marshall was found by reporters and compelled to make some statement. He wanted to convey his pleasure in his present post, but the words he chose were flippant: "I've got the best job I ever had now; no responsibilities. Now, with the Vice Presidency there is nothing to worry about. If things go wrong, no one can blame you for it. You have no policies to shape, and precedent
says you can't say anything. All I have to do is to vote, and I am not responsible to any
one." A very simple "explanation" for the Vice Presidential office, except the
complexities of his official relationships belied the simplicity he was trying to caricature.

Privately Marshall was fuming. Wilson's plan to go to Europe had been made
without any communication with his Vice President. How could Marshall know what
would be a proper response to make to the press? Lois Marshall was sympathetic but
tried to alleviate her husband's anger by remarking how busy the President must have
been in such a trying circumstance. Her words barely relieved his indignation.4

Woodrow Wilson was not so busy preparing for his trip abroad that he failed to
notice the controversy drawing his Vice President into its vortex. Sometime during the
day of 28 November Mark Thistlethwaite received a telephone call from the President.
He wanted to see Marshall, but not at the White House. Thistlethwaite was to try to
arrange a meeting between him and the Vice President at the latter's suite at the New
Willard Hotel. That evening the two men met alone.

Ostensibly, Wilson asked Marshall to assume certain executive responsibilities
during his absence, presiding at cabinet meetings, for example. Everything discussed by
the President concerned specific responsibilities connected with the office. Marshall later
related to Thistlethwaite that no mention was made regarding his exercise of executive
prerogative nor of his word given in oath to Wilson that he would not do anything in an
executive capacity without first obtaining Presidential approval. Despite the fact that
plans had been made, Marshall's speaking trip west and visit to Arizona were
automatically canceled.5
What difference did it make to Wilson that his Vice President be in Washington if he, the President, were to be out of the country? A probable answer, according to Senator Ashurst, is that Wilson wanted "his successor in Washington should misfortune happen." A practical answer is that diplomatic affairs required the Vice President to remain in the Capitol as the President's chief representative. In a few days the peace delegation from Japan would be stopping in Washington on his way to Paris, and there would be social contacts with certain diplomats stationed in Washington.

By 30 November when the official announcement was made that Wilson would lead his country's peace delegation to Paris, it was no longer news. Heated controversy centered around the members of Wilson's delegation, which did not include one Republican Senator. The White House made known that the Vice President had been asked to remain in Washington during the President's absence and "to remain here to receive the Japanese prince." One reporter blurted out to Marshall that the latter was staying in the capital, really, "to veto and sign bills."

"Oh no, nothing of the sort," Marshall cracked back, "I have already made my position plain. I am not going to be a Bolshevist President" (and take over the Government)! Many were disturbed that the President saw fit to leave the country in order to be the leader of the United States delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Colorado Senator Charles Thomas just knew that the President would be subjected to the blame or praise of every squabble at the Conference and be up against "the most experienced and practical politicians of diplomatic intrigue of his generation." Democratic Senator John Sharp Williams bemoaned, "Two months ago W. W. was the foremost character in the
world. He had reached a high pinnacle of human distinction. "Today I doubt if he has twenty friends in Congress." On 3 December Senator Lawrence Sherman of Illinois expressed his displeasure at the President's being absent from the United States and introduced a resolution which held the Presidential office to be vacant. His words were interrupted repeatedly by Senator Williams who tried to explain the reasons for the President's leaving. 8

In general, Democrats supported Wilson's proposed absence; Republicans did not. For one thing, the President had "stacked" the delegation so that only one member was Republican—and he in name only. No Republican Congressman would be present at Paris in any official capacity. Some felt that a bipartisan committee of Senators ought to go to the Peace Conference just to know about the development. Democratic Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, at this time Foreign Relations Committee chairman, had not been consulted by Wilson in regard to the trip to Europe, and thus Hitchcock supported Republican Senator Albert Cummins in his idea of the Senatorial delegation. Similar resolutions from the Senate and the House were submitted by Republicans to remove Woodrow Wilson from office and to place Thomas Marshall in the White House. Senator Sherman submitted to the Judiciary Committee his resolution to the effect that President Wilson's physical absence constituted "an inability to discharge the powers and duties of the President" and that these shall evolve immediately to the Vice President and "be accepted as the act of the President of the United States." Representative William A. Rodenberg of Illinois was less critical of Wilson, for his resolution would allow Wilson to resume the office of the President when he returned to the United States and to Washington, District of Columbia, the seat of the Government. House Republican floor
leader James R. Mann vocally opined that Wilson's efforts should not be "pin-pricked" while he was "abroad on so important a mission." 9

Wilson left America for Europe one month before the Conference was to begin (18 January 1919), because he wanted first-hand contact with the scenes of Europe that revealed the effects of the war. "These visits, these regrettable and hysterical visits, convinced Woodrow Wilson that the peoples of Europe were with him heart and soul," remembered Harold Nicholson, a member of the British delegation at the Conference. 10

As President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing were both members of the delegation, Vice President Marshall was the highest ranking member of the Government actually inside the United States during this period. (Wilson would be away until 24 February.)

Little notice was given by Americans to the Vice President's activities, because the eyes of the world were focused upon the Peace Conference. Marshall's first official act was to receive visitors from Japan. The Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference took occasion to spend a short time in Washington for the benefit of its head, Prince Kigashi-Fushimi, who had never been to America. Marshall had a warm regard for Japan because of several pleasant contacts with Japanese. Upon arriving in Washington, Ambassador Viscount Sutemi Chinda called on the Vice President and reminded him of their acquaintance with each other during college days. Chinda had been a student at DePauw University not far from Wabash College in west central Indiana. Marshall was surprised to discover that China's successor, Aimaro Sato, also had gone to DePauw and had known the Vice President as a student. He was pleased to see again Admiral Baron Uriu, who had toasted the Vice President at the San Francisco Exposition. And, he was honored to meet a prince of the Japanese royal family. 11
In diplomatic ceremony before the delegation of Asians clothed in western dress, Marshall read his few remarks. While officially he represented the American President, the words he spoke portrayed his own philosophy of foreign relations. "We appreciate the distinguished courtesy which the Imperial Government of Japan has shown to us by this visit. In welcoming you we acknowledge that splendid part which you took in the winning of the war for civilization." Marshall perceived this idea to be novel. "You may think this a strange statement, but it expresses my view—that civilization does not depend upon race, religion, or culture, but rather upon that thoughtful consideration which every man and every nation ought to have for the rights of every other man and every other nation."12

The doctrine of Jeffersonian democracy was here being enlarged to cover the earth's people! Here was no taint of racism which had filtered into the nation during the previous several decades and which was working against the Negro in the East and against the oriental in the West. The Vice President genuinely appreciated the action of Japan in exorcising the Germans from the northern Pacific and from the Shantung Peninsula of China. The Japanese notables present surely appreciated the Vice President’s sentiments. It would remain for them to obtain an education in Western tolerance later at Versailles. Following the ceremony, the Vice President and his wife hosted the delegation at a diplomatic breakfast at the Capitol.

At midday the Marshalls met for lunch with Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels and his wife. Coming at this particular time, a day before his first cabinet meeting, the engagement gave Marshall opportunity to share with Daniels his own philosophy
regarding a Vice President's attendance at cabinet meetings. Marshall, in turn, could learn from his friend about the procedures of the weekly meetings. 14

At the appointed time the department heads met in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Marshall took his place at the head of the long conference table, on each side of which four officers sat. The Vice President knew these men socially, but deep friendships had been made with only a few: Josephus Daniels, Franklin Lane (who was with Marshall on the 1915 trip to the West), and Newton Baker (an old political friend and fraternity brother). These eight or nine men were usually a sober sight, conducting business in accord with the needs of the hour and the whims of the President. Now Wilson was away. It remained to be seen how the cabinet would function. 15

Marshall read a statement at the beginning of the meeting. He did not wish the cabinet to misunderstand his purpose for being with them in the President's absence. Speaking slowly, he read, in part, "I am here and am acting in obedience to a request preferred by the President upon the eve of his departure and also at your request. But I am here informally and personally. I am not undertaking to exercise any official duty or function. I shall preside in an unofficial and informal way over your meeting out of deference to your desires and those of the President." His reading was soberly presented. The Vice President made his statement, he said, because he wanted no misinterpretation of his presence by either cabinet Democrat or Congressional Republican. (Wilson may have suggested Marshall's offering of a statement to offset Republican criticism of the President's leaving the country, a probable topic of discussion between the two men in the New Willard suite on the eve of Wilson's departure.) When he finished speaking, his mood lightened. "He was bright and full of jest," Daniels recorded in his diary. 16
This was the last cabinet meeting for Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo, who had resigned to become Director-General of Railroads. Since Robert Lansing was in Paris, his Undersecretary, Frank L. Polk, sat in as Acting Secretary of State. Agriculture Secretary David Houston presented his report on the pricing of wheat, which prompted the Vice President to comment with regard to farmers, "They voted against us because they said we put the price of wheat too low and next year they will vote against us because we wasted public money." There was apparently a common feeling to support his contention. His first contact with the members in a cabinet meeting lasted one and a half hours. It had been enjoyable, an example of Wilsonian precedent-setting.17

Outside the White House, reporters gathered to learn how Marshall fared with this new experience. The Vice President became characteristically humorous before the newsmen. In his dry way he said he had been quite interested in the publicized legal opinions regarding his new stature, and to find out the truth he wrote a letter to Indiana for advice from his old friend, Constable Newt Plum. Plum (in reality a folksy cartoon character) "wrote back, 'The President by leaving the country loses his office but retains the salary.'" Marshall smiled and said that since he was not going to get the President’s salary he was not going to exert himself in the capacity. Nobody recorded the laughter that surely followed Marshall’s remark. Again, in a time when leaders were experiencing pressures and anxiety about the issues of the day, Tom Marshall’s Hoosier humor relieved the air and also communicated his own position that he was not about to “take over” the Presidency.18

The next week Marshall got to the cabinet meeting late. As he took his seat, he heard the executives discussing what should be done with industries which had benefited
by governmental contracts during the war but which now faced economic crises because production had almost halted. Josephus Daniels proposed that the War Trade Board apply an embargo which, kept in effect, would allow the "infant industries" to sell their products and be saved from bankruptcy. "If not," he advanced, "Congress may impose heavy tariff duties and compel their aid and make it an entering wedge for a high protective tariff." Marshall perceived openly that the laboring men of the country would become unemployed and that businessmen were anxious that something be done to remedy the problem. Labor Secretary William Wilson was not alarmed. He had confidence that the businessmen could handle problems as they arose, including the prevention of labor troubles. Commerce Secretary William Redfield shared Wilson's hopefulness, and took opportunity to read a letter from a man who was disturbed about the low supply of bristles at that time. Taking the ever-present cigar from his mouth, Marshall blurted out, "Tell him to shave and get his own raw material!" Very witty, thought Daniels.19

At the end of the first week in the new year, 1919, news came of the death of former President Theodore Roosevelt. Marshall, while Governor of Indiana and a national candidate prior to 1913, had fought Roosevelt's ideas and bombast with criticism and occasional curtness. His public response to Roosevelt's death was respectful but restrained: "I am not one of those who have no feeling of regret over the death of a man who occupied so large and prominent a place in the political affairs of American life as did the late President Roosevelt simply by reason of the fact that I did not agree with him in his political views nor approve of his theories of statesmanship. The greatest safety to the Republic arises from the sharp clashes of men whose ideas are as far apart as the
poles. This clashing of ideas enables the common people at large to pursue a middle
course. The late President undoubtedly will leave a permanent impression upon
American life. He was a born fighter. . . ."20

Wilson in time learned of the death of his old political foe and promptly sent a
telegram to the Vice President, requesting him to act as his representative at the funeral.
Marshall had conflicting feelings about this request but presented the matter to the cabinet
at its 7 January meeting. Discussion focused on whether Marshall should go to
Roosevelt's funeral. The Vice President reminded his associates that it was to be a private
funeral with only those permitted who had been issued cards. He would be butting in, he
reasoned. Furthermore, Roosevelt's daughter, Alice Longworth, made it a practice of
snubbing Marshall and his wife whenever they chanced to meet. No, held Marshall, he
should not plan to attend the funeral. After more discussion the Cabinet decided to
contact Alice Longworth's husband Nicholas, then a Republican House member from
Ohio. Marshall retreated from his position and mumbled appreciation of their confidence
and support. And, since the President had asked him, he would go to New York. He
quietly insisted that Mrs. Marshall be permitted to accompany him as they had been
married for twenty-four years and virtually never been separated. With the Cabinet
promising him a private car on the train there was no further argument.21

The reading public soon learned that Vice President Marshall would attend the
Roosevelt funeral as Wilson's personal representative along with other governmental and
military officials and with former members of Roosevelt's cabinet. The bereaved family,
in accord with the Colonel's wishes, originally planned a simple ceremony at Christ
Episcopal Church in Oyster Bay, Long Island, with only relatives and close friends in
attendance. Marshall telephoned the Roosevelts from Washington to arrange plans for him to attend. One of several close friends of the deceased President who were at the funeral was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, whom Marshall respected but whom he would find to be a formidable political adversary to the Administration in the months ahead.

Marshall was still attending the weekly meetings of the cabinet when on 21 January a cable from Wilson was brought before that executive body. The President wanted to know their opinion of the prohibition order, as it was based on the need of the nation to conserve coal and food during wartime. Since the war was over and there was plenty of coal and food, Burleson argued that the order ought to be annulled. Marshall disagreed, and with him stood Glass, Gregory, and Daniels. The conclusion of the discussion culminated in the judgment that the President should let his order remain in effect so far as alcoholic beverages were concerned, "but that it should be annulled as to non-alcoholic drinks." At the day's end a private dinner was prepared at the home of California Senator and Mrs. James D. Phelan with the Daniels and the Marshalls in attendance. After dining the ladies repaired to their sitting room while the men smoked cigars and "talked about oil and how Great Britain was controlling all over the world."

Vice President Marshall in time ceased to attend the cabinet meetings. He candidly admitted to his secretary, Mark Thistlethwaite, that the conference among the cabinet members could go on satisfactorily without his presence. Lois Marshall recalled that her husband was philosophically opposed to the idea of a Vice President, who is presiding officer of a bi-partisan legislative assembly, being privy to Administration matters. She remembered his saying, "It would be very embarrassing at times to be in a confidential relationships to both the legislative and the executive branches."
perceived that with the President absent the cabinet meetings were essentially conferences of executive department heads. He was not head of a department of the executive branch. As presiding officer of the United States Senate it was his constitutional responsibility to moderate the discussions and debates of that body. The American people placed him in that position and, being the man of principle that he was, he could not reconcile his presence nor his position with that chief administrative council. He could not feel productive since he was not in a position of power over Senators and thus had no group subservient to him to do his bidding or to carry out his policies. His was indeed a peculiar position. 23

While Wilson was presenting his idea of the League of Nations “Covenant” to the Third Plenary Session of the Paris Peace Conference, Thomas Marshall began to enjoy at least some of the Presidential responsibilities. Secretary Daniels, present with Marshall at dinners with the ministers of the Netherlands and of Spain, wrote in his diary that the Vice President was not in sympathy with the behind-the-scenes maneuvering of Albert Burleson and Gilbert Hitchcock in getting Senators to support the President’s position with respect to the League and the treaty with Germany as a one-package consideration. On one occasion, Daniels noted, Marshall "rather talked against the League of Peace [by saying that] he had not made up his mind and that it ought to be discussed without the attempt to line up Senators as Burleson was trying to do." Others in the Administration were also concerned about the President's apparent obsession with the League idea. 24

The American people were following the news reports on the Paris Peace Conference at the same time that 1,200 American “technical troops” were stationed in
Archangel in northern Russia as part of an Allied Expeditionary force. Their mission was to support White Russians engaged in a fierce civil war with Red (Bolshevik) armies. Half of the United States Senate wanted the Americans returned home. Hence, on 14 February 1919 a motion to table such a resolution was presented before the Senate. Thirty-three Senators voted for; thirty-three voted against, and thirty did not vote. The Vice President broke the tie vote by favoring the tabling of the resolution. Whether the Americans would be brought home sooner rather than later would be irrelevant to the Soviets who saw foreign troops on their soil as a violation of their sovereignty and of their Revolution.25

III

Before any firm commitments had been made at the Conference in Paris, the President returned home, arriving in Boston on 24 February. Meeting Wilson at the ship was his secretary, Joseph Tumulty, along with many American notables, including the well-known actor, Leo Carrillo. Journalist Ray Stannard Baker was there, a member of the American staff, who would later write about Wilson's experience at the Peace Conference. At Washington a victory parade was held in honor of the returning President and of the Washington area "doughboys." In tune with the high spirit of the times Wilson and Marshall walked side by side as marchers in the parade, and after awhile Wilson witnessed the rest of the parade from a reviewing box. The people were glad to see their President, a renowned world figure, home again.26
Woodrow Wilson tried to make the most of his time home, as he planned to leave for Europe a second time, on 5 March. At a White House dinner for members of the Senate and House committees on foreign relations he talked with them about the proposed League. They listened respectfully, saying little at the time. Two days later, Henry Cabot Lodge took the floor of the Senate and talked for over two hours against the proposed Covenant. On 2 March a "round robin" message from thirty-nine Senators and Senators-elect declared that discussion of the League question would be valid only after peace is definitely established among the nations at the Peace Conference. The quantitative strength of the "round robin" should have told Wilson something about the strategy he must follow to achieve his end, but he did not listen. Speaking before an audience of over 5,000 in the old Metropolitan Opera House at Broadway and Thirty-ninth Street in New York, he in effect told the Senators who opposed him that they would have to follow his direction.

The impact upon Capitol Hill was not surprising. If sadness overtook the company on Inauguration Day, March 1917, two years later the tone was one of bitterness mingled with helplessness. The Sixty-fifth Congress ended without passing the General Deficiency bill which would have allowed the Government to pay large expenses. Defeat of the bill was accomplished by the filibustering tactics of three Senators: Sherman (Illinois), La Follette (Wisconsin), and France (Maryland), working unceasingly for twenty-six hours. When noontime came, the President of the Senate banged his gavel, saying, "Adjourned sine Deo" (without God), instead of the usual sine die (indefinitely adjourned). Marshall was visibly agitated as were many Senators. The Senate was made impotent. Not only had the General Deficiency bill failed to pass but a host of other
measures had been stillborn: appropriation bills for the army, the navy, for agriculture, for utilities and coal and oil lands, and so on. The most regrettable loss was the railroad appropriation which three out of four Republican Senators, along with Democrats, wanted passed. The Senate scene was a battlefield of emotions. Senator Martin of Virginia had wanted desperately to pass the bill. Senator Lodge seemed embarrassed at the tactics of his Republican colleagues. The President, about to leave the country, must have gritted his teeth when he said, "A group of men in the Senate have deliberately chosen to embarrass the Administration of the Government, to imperil the financial interests of the railway systems of the country, and to make arbitrary use of powers intended to be employed in the interest of the people." Before Wilson's return to the United States four months later, the Senate would be in almost constant debate concerning the treaty with Germany.

During the spring of 1919 and prior to the convening of the Sixty-sixth Congress, speeches were made throughout the country for and against United States involvement in an international association where her independence of action might be compromised. In a debate at Witherspoon Hall in Philadelphia during this time Vice President Marshall and local lawyer G. W. Pepper spoke, respectively, for and against ratification of the Versailles Treaty. Seated beside each other during the dinner that preceded the speechmaking Marshall and Pepper engaged in conversation. Pepper later noted that Marshall said "many things wholly inconsistent with the speech he subsequently delivered. . . . Then he made an eloquent speech in support of the Covenant. As he came back to his chair and sat down, just before I was called to my feet, he put his hand over his mouth and whispered to me, "I haven't read it [the Covenant], but we must stand by
Pepper was amazed that the Vice President would support a document which he had not even taken the trouble to examine and that he would go so far as to deceive the public in defense of his President.  

The 1918 congressional elections had turned the tide of Democratic influence. The Sixty-sixth Senate now had forty-nine Republicans and forty-seven Democrats. The potential for surprises on Senate votes was great. As Senator Ashurst saw it, "If even one insurgent voted with the Democrats a tie would result, vis. 48–48; the Democratic Vice-President, Marshall, would give the 'casting' vote and would thus have given control of the Senate to the Democrats." Therefore, proud men of the Republican side of the aisle had to suppress their differences among themselves to secure a voting strength of blended "insurgent" and "Old Guard" Republican votes. Senator Lodge was now chairman of the most important committee involved, the Foreign Relations Committee. With a bare majority Republicans were able to place men unfriendly to the League in the committee. Historian Thomas Bailey, writing on the League fight, concluded that this committee-packing "was a great advantage to the opponents of the treaty, for they could delay it in committee until a hostile public opinion could be aroused. . . ."  

On 23 May the peace treaty was debated for three hours in the Senate. The Senators had not yet received the text of the treaty, but this did not keep them silent as they talked of the League and whether or not the national government should become entwined with that alien association abroad. Republican Hiram Johnson of California felt that the Administration was trying to hide something. Democrat Gilbert Hitchcock, top Administration man on the Foreign Relations Committee, denied that allegation. Senator
Lodge countered that every shopkeeper in Germany was reading the treaty and yet the Senate had only a "worthless" official abstract.

The Republicans had drawn up their slate of Foreign Relations Committee officers now that they held the majority position in the Senate. Marshall took advantage of the continuing friction within the Republican camp between the Old Guard and the Progressives. He ruled that until the new committees were organized, the old ones would act with authority. Lodge objected to Marshall's ruling and tried to find some reasonable compromise with the Progressive leader, Senator Borah of Idaho. Five days later the Republicans succeeded in organizing their new committees.30

Before the Republicans began their opposition to Wilson's League, Congress after forty years of effort finally passed the Constitutional amendment resolution advocating woman suffrage. Before ratification by the states would take place, the signing of the resolution by the Vice President occurred. Looking on at the signing were interested Senators and representatives of women's organizations, in particular the National American Woman Suffrage Association. State Governors reacted either favorably or unfavorably to calling special sessions to ratify the amendment quickly.31

On the day that a draft of the Peace Treaty appeared in the newspapers Senator Borah presented the draft on the floor of the Senate. The Republicans now had something with which to work. Meanwhile, in Paris the pragmatic diplomats with whom Woodrow Wilson had to deal demanded their way so much that only four out of Wilson's original "fourteen points" found their way into the Treaty of Versailles. On 28 June the peace treaty with Germany was signed by her and by the Allied and Associated Powers. Americans waited eagerly for the return of their President from that historic meeting.
Ten days after the Allies' signing of the Treaty of Peace with Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, Woodrow Wilson and his party arrived home aboard the U.S.S. George Washington. Thousands of Americans prepared to greet Wilson as he disembarked at Hoboken, New Jersey, at that time an important rail terminal and port of disembarkation on the Hudson River. The Navy had five dreadnoughts and forty destroyers in The Narrows nearby to initiate his grand welcome. Seaplanes and a blimp hovered overhead until he arrived safely on land. On the flagship Pennsylvania six miles offshore was the official welcoming committee, which included the Marshalls, cabinet members, and two of the Wilson daughters. As the Pennsylvania drew alongside the George Washington, the Vice President telegraphed greetings and congratulations from his ship. The message was amiable but wordy, flowery but not insincere.¹

Wilson's mood was lightened by the resounding reception he received. He had not been satisfied with the final terms of the Treaty of Peace. The French and the English had "doctored" it so that the Germans were made to feel that the judgment of the world was against them. Furthermore, the matter of reparations shattered the spirit of amity which Wilson hoped would develop from the Peace Conference. The one ideal he had striven for, the League of Nations, was adopted in principle by the Allies. It was now his goal to see that the United States Government, in particular the Senate, accepted that ideal along with the Treaty which the Germans had signed at Versailles on 28 June.
On 10 July 1919 Wilson submitted to the United States Senate for ratification the Versailles Treaty with the League Covenant attached. Before the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations the President expressed himself candidly. He acknowledged that some persons still entertained doubts about "the meaning and implication of certain articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations." For Wilson, Article 10 of the Covenant was "the very backbone of the whole covenant" by which means the United States was under no legal obligation to come to the aid of a nation or nations threatened by an aggressor nation unless it chose to do so. However, as he pointed out, the obligation was "a very grave and solemn moral obligation... binding in conscience only, not in law."\(^2\)

A month earlier Vice President Marshall in Philadelphia addressed a meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. He showed himself unreservedly in favor of the League and held that there was nothing in the Covenant contrary to the Constitution of the United States. He reprimanded those who opposed America's involvement in the League: "It happens that a majority of those who are vehemently attacking the proposed League of Peace are the authors of that course of conduct which took the American people from their isolated position and set them down in the politics of the world. When we accumulated Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines, our quarantine clause ceased to work." The speaker believed that the country was ideologically in the European conflict before any official decision had been made to enter it. The "soul of America" demanded, he said, that Americans help to make the world safe for democracy. Now, the task was to make democracy safe for the world through the League of Nations.
A week after the President’s return, Marshall met with Wilson to go over the wording of the resolution accepting the treaty. Close consultation with his chief had apparently changed Marshall's view on the League in contrast to his oratorical side-stepping in the Witherspoon Hall debate with George Pepper the previous spring. The next two months would be taken up with hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations prior to debate in the Senate Chamber on 10 September and following.\(^3\)

The decision to take his case directly to the American people was made by Wilson in mid-July. He knew the people would support him even if the obstinate Republicans (especially Lodge) did not. Marshall was in close touch with the situation. In a letter to the President's secretary dated 26 July 1919 the Vice President sent resolutions from Senators favoring the League ("Two of the signers are Republicans"). Marshall was desirous of leaving town for a brief rest but had second thoughts even though Wilson saw no reason for him to remain in Washington. "... I think that unless sickness compels my leaving no opportunity for criticism should be offered by my going away," Marshall wrote in a second message to the White House. He remembered the controversy over Wilson's leaving Washington for Paris and he recognized that the center of national debate on the Treaty and the League of Nations was the Senate. For him to leave at a time that might become crucial would be poor judgment indeed.\(^4\)

Senator Lodge a few days later expressed himself forcefully on the floor of the Senate. Article 10, he believed, could only involve the United States in situations which could prove embarrassing if not disastrous. What was needed were "reservations" to the proposed Covenant, amendments which would be acceptable not only to the United States Government but also to the Allied and Associated Powers. Another meeting was
subsequently arranged between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the President for 19 August. At that time the Republicans "grilled" the President for three and a half hours. The experience only intensified the hostility between Wilson and Lodge. As John Morton Blum aptly phrased it, "A mutual, devouring animosity stunted in both men any propensity to search rationally for a compromise." They were both proud men. Wilson may have been President but Lodge was King of the Committee, and this dual monarchy could not long abide.5

The next day found Marshall writing a memorandum to Joseph Tumulty, the President’s personal secretary, reflecting the Vice President’s view of developing tensions on Capitol Hill: “The present condition of the Peace Treaty is lamentable. It accomplishes nothing to endeavor to diagnose the situation and determine whether it is political or patriotic. All patriotism ought to be political and all politics ought to be patriotic.” For Marshall the whole issue, because of its long-ranged significance for the nation, ought to be approached in a bipartisan manner, no more and no less.

Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who had experienced his own difficulties with the President at Paris, perceived the matter exactly: "While this quarrel is not new or sudden it has grown in virulence since the President's return from Paris until it has reached a state where there is a disposition to reject anything the President proposes, whether good or bad, and a determination on the part of the President to force the Senate to accept his measures whether they like them or not. . . ."6

Determined to take his cause to the people, the President left Washington on 3 September for a speaking tour to the Pacific coast and back. For three weeks he and his party journeyed over a thousand miles and visited over thirty cities, attempting to elicit
popular support for the Treaty of Peace with the Covenant of the League of Nations as an integral part. Meanwhile, the Republican "irreconcilables", Senators Hiram Johnson and William Borah, left for their own western tour, following Wilson's entourage some distance away and speaking energetically against ratification of the treaty.

Away from the Capitol only a few days the President learned of the imminent return of the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. Pershing. A wire to the Vice President communicated Wilson's desire that Marshall represent him at Pershing's reception in Washington on 12 September. The First Division came back to New York City on the 10th and enjoyed a festive parade down Fifth Avenue. In Washington "the fifth full general in the history of the country" was greeted as a hero in the eyes of the nation.

Inside a large room in the Shoreham Hotel on the appointed day, this small, mustached man was extended official greetings by another small, mustached gentleman, the Vice President. The experience to Pershing -seemed in such contrast to the General's experiences of the recent past. He wanted nothing more at that moment than to be a boy again in his native Missouri. Now, he was Cincinnatus Redivivus, General Washington reincarnated. Marshall's words of appreciation conveyed the nation's admiration and adulation of this wartime leader.

After his command performance with Pershing the Vice President, his wife, and their little ward, Morrison, went to Atlantic City for a short vacation, the first in many months. But, even there Marshall could not escape reporters. They wanted to know about the progress of the treaty debate in the Senate. His answer was clear: "I have no doubt the treaty with the League of Nations covenant will be ratified by the United States
Senate. The utmost changes possible are mild reservations embracing the President’s explanation of the treaty." The Senate had delayed long enough in taking positive action, he asserted, since opposition contentions had been unfounded. He alluded to the provision of self-determination for the smaller countries, and referred to appeals through him to the Senate from people of European lands. Marshall could not restrain his humor which the reporters by custom had come to look for in his remarks. One such appeal, he mentioned, was addressed to

Thomas R. Marshall, President of United States Senate, we rely on you for our freedom.

EGYPTIAN LADIES

The Vice President was frankly amused at the wording and the source of the appeal. He quipped, "It was a matter of regret that it was not within my province to comply with the appeal and thus go down in history as ‘Emancipator of the Harem.’"

Meanwhile, Wilson’s nationwide tour to arouse public support was a futile quest since Republican votes controlled the Senate. News headlines hinted that the President was getting the public support he sought. In Pueblo, Colorado, on 25 September, Wilson spoke on behalf of his treaty and sent a message of appreciation to Arizona Senator Henry F. Ashurst who publicly defended the President’s position. Other Democratic Senators followed Ashurst’s example.

II

The headlines for 26 September did not convey the true seriousness of Wilson’s sudden end of his tour. The President has suffered a "nervous breakdown," it was
reported. His tour had been canceled, and his train was speeding eastward to get him home for a rest. One reporter wrote in Kansas City, Missouri, that "the wonder is not that President Wilson has come to the end of his physical resources now, but that he did not come to the end of them long ago." It was expected by Washington Congressmen that the President would lead the fight for acceptance of the treaty by the Senate. No one yet expected matters to get worse. Not all the country's attention at this time was completely on the Senate or the treaty or even the President: the World's Series baseball championship games were about to begin between Chicago and Cincinnati!

The President experienced a second and more severe stroke on the second day in October. On that fateful day Edith Wilson discovered her husband lying on the bathroom floor, paralyzed with cuts over his temple and nose. She quickly summoned the President's personal physician, Cary T. Grayson. No word was given until diagnoses could be obtained. The public was not told the exact circumstances, though the first medical bulletin issued by Dr. Grayson at ten o'clock that evening was foreboding:

The President is a very sick man.
His condition is less favorable today, and he has remained in bed throughout the day.
After a consultation with Dr. F. K. Dercum of Philadelphia, Drs. Sterling Ruffin, and E. R. Stitt of Washington, in which all agreed as to his condition, it was determined that absolute rest is essential for some time.

At 11 o'clock the next day the report read: "The President had a fairly good night, but his condition is not at all good this morning." Grayson had called in specialists to examine the patient and to corroborate his medical testimony. Dr. Dercum was a nerve specialist from Philadelphia, Dr. Ruffin was a Washington practitioner, and Dr. Stitt was attached
to the Naval Medical Corps. Outside this intimate circle no one really knew the
President's condition. Irwin (Ike) Hoover, chief usher at the White House, noted every
person who came to the Presidential mansion every day. His diary entries from 20
October to 31 December 1920 would read alike regarding the President's condition: "all
just the same." 12

Others in Washington suspected that the illness was considerably more severe
than Grayson had indicated. Senator Ashurst learned from Senator Lewis H. Ball of
Delaware, himself a physician, that the President was seriously ill as a result of the strain
of the past two years. Ashurst considered the implications of serious and continued
illness of the President for the government and the nation. The Constitution dictated that
should Wilson be unable to pursue his responsibilities as Chief Executive the position
would devolve to Vice President Marshall. Both Cabinet members and Congressmen
busily discussed the crisis of leadership. A letter from Senator Hitchcock to Bryan
conveyed his fear of executive inattention or mismanagement of matters foreign and
domestic. That weekend David Houston discussed Wilson’s incapacity with Newton
Baker. Houston feared openly that the President had suffered "some sort of collapse."
Baker looked very scared. From Tumulty the following day Houston learned that Wilson
was paralyzed in his left limbs. Both men were anxious.

By the end of that week Wilson could hardly utter words, although he managed to
recite in a whisper the limerick about the pelican, Grayson would later relate. At midday
on Sunday, 5 October, Houston unexpectedly met the Vice President and his wife as they
were dining at the Shoreham Hotel. Marshall, visibly disturbed, became vocal about not
being told anything about Wilson’s health. Marshall was incensed at the "blackout" of
news. His sense of inadequacy and his resentment at being left ignorant of information from the White House frustrated his composure. He flared up at Houston who represented the Administration’s cover-up at that moment. He said he ought immediately to be informed, that it would be a tragedy for him to assume the duties of President at best, and that it would be equally a tragedy for the American people. He knew many men who knew more about the affairs of the government than he did, and it would be especially trying for him if he were to assume executive duties without warning. It seemed unreasonable, Marshall exclaimed, for the attending physicians to keep him—and all Americans—in the dark about the President. Houston told him nothing because of his pledge of secrecy to Tumulty. He promised Marshall nothing but the hope that he would learn more the next day.¹³

Everybody in the Capitol seemed on edge. The Senate continued its debate on the Versailles Treaty the next day, Monday. At one point in the debate on 6 October Senators Borah and Hitchcock got especially angry at each other. Without warning Marshall interrupted with the announcement that he had received a letter to be presented before the Senate. This statement caught the antagonists by surprise and stopped short the angry words on the floor. Borah and Hitchcock awaited the important communication. The Secretary of the Senate read aloud the letter from the father of a newborn boy. The father wanted one of the Senators to choose a name for his new son: "The man who will give the baby the biggest prize can have the name. . . . Mr. Marshall, see what you can do for me." The response by the Senators was uproarious laughter. The Vice President’s ploy worked. Passions had cooled for the moment.¹⁴
On the day that Wilson experienced his second stroke, a cerebral thrombosis, the King and Queen of the Belgians and their son set foot on American soil. The Vice President on behalf of the ailing President extended official greetings to the trio in Hoboken, the port of disembarkation. The Secretary of State, the Ambassador to Belgium, and military heads provided the receiving retinue. King Albert, a young-looking forty-four year-old man, about six feet three inches in height, presented an impressive appearance in his military uniform. His wife looked like a diminutive schoolgirl in her white serge suit and white turban covering her black hair. Behind the Queen on the gangplank walked her seventeen-year old son Leopold, not too sure of how he should behave in this large, unmonarchical environment.

Marshall, six to seven inches shorter than the King, offered official words of welcome. The King ceremoniously replied, but spoke so softly most did not hear him. After the brief exchange the notables got into waiting automobiles, the King and the Vice President in one, the Queen and Mrs. Marshall in another, and Secretary Lansing and Prince Leopold in a third.15

The welcome of Vice President Marshall to King Albert and his family was joyously praised by newspapers around the country. The Montgomery (Alabama)Advertiser was extravagant in its esteem of the Vice President. It carried the full text of his welcoming speech and added a couple of paragraphs of evaluation, in effect, of praise. The Alabama editor was persuaded that Marshall was a better man than he had been given credit for being and that people who laughed at his humorous remarks had not bothered to consider that "there is something more to the Vice President." For him, "Mr.
Marshall is full-grown Presidential timber, a sound, safe man in whose hands the helm of State would be held steadily and safely should the misfortune of illness made it necessary for President Wilson to call the Vice President temporarily to the former's post." The editor's words seemed aimed to reassure his readers that all was not darkness during this period of Presidential disability. The governmental machinery would carry on until the President reassumed his official responsibilities.16

Marshall, however, continued to show the strain of not knowing Wilson's true condition. In a letter to Lansing, following his contact with the Belgian monarch, he complained of not being accorded sufficient regard in this new "position":

Sir,

What becomes of me as vice President is very unimportant but, when I travel in the name of the President, I expect to be treated as the President would be treated.

In view of the experience I had when going to New York to represent the President in the welcome to King Albert, I desire to notify your Department that, if called upon to represent him again, a complete schedule of the way in which I am to be treated as representative must be furnished to me. This is official and not personal.

With consideration of the highest esteem,
Believe me to be,
Very respectfully yours,

An immediate reply to the Vice President came not only from the Secretary of State but also from Breckenridge Long, Third Undersecretary of State, who was in charge of
arranging the official welcoming for the monarch. Long wrote Marshall on the very next day, attempting to apologize for any "inconvenience" or "unsatisfactory arrangement" that have occurred to the Vice President during this trip to New York City. Lansing's letter was personal as well as official. He was "deeply mortified and distressed" about the situation and explained that he had been out of Washington at the time the arrangements had been made for Marshall to met the monarchs. As Lansing tried to explain: "An official of this Government, second only to the President, upon such a mission should have a private car placed at his disposal. It would have been the proper thing to do consonant with your office and mission. That it was not done I greatly regret and would gladly make amends in any way that I can for what occurred." He repeated that he was personally distressed and hoped that the Vice President would "forget the incident which will never be repeated." Still, Marshall's ire had not died down. He felt it necessary to add one more word. He had been humiliated. His pride had been hurt. "I was not asking for a car but I was objecting to the Secretary of State arranging two seats for me [and my wife] and a drawing room for himself. As far as I am concerned, the incident is closed." 17

His strong words to Lansing were not directed personally against the Secretary of State. Marshall could understand how bureaucratic bungling occurs. Frustration arose because in light of Wilson's illness and isolation there simply was no one to whom he felt he could turn for advice. He had to "let off steam." His wife and his pastor, Dr. Charles Wood, were doubtless aware of his quandary, but they could not give him the satisfaction he sought. He had to remain strong, be his own man.
Acting on behalf of the President, Marshall was expected to entertain official guests, but if he could not provide for the expenses of that entertainment from his governmental allotment he had to find other ways. Thomas Marshall was not a spendthrift but he was thrifty. While not a man of great means, his salary provided him and Lois with a comfortable standard of living, though they felt they could afford only a hotel suite, not an entire house. They had lived at the Shoreham and now were at the New Willard Hotel. Custom required him to host the official dinner for the King and Queen of the Belgians. What he discovered was that custom did not allow the royal family on such an occasion to enter "a public place of entertainment." Marshall's plan to host them at a dining room at the Willard simply was not according to protocol. "I was at my wits' end to know what to do," he recalled, "when, fortunately for me, one of the most patriotic and charitably disposed women in all America came to my assistance." Mrs. Thomas F. Walsh, widow of a Denver mining millionaire, was a close friend of Lois Marshall. When Mrs. Walsh heard of the Vice President's dilemma, she made her home available. In his last years Marshall looked back on that experience as "perhaps the most notable occasion ever had in Washington. The front doors were thrown open and all the higher officials of every department were present . . ." One lady of Washington's high society, Mrs. Henry Wilder Keyes, recorded for history her disdain for the Walshes' taste in interior decoration and felt embarrassment that the Vice President—heir apparent—"should have had no more suitable setting in which to proffer hospitality to visiting royalty." King Albert and Queen Elizabeth did not appear to mind the decor. Their genuine enjoyment of the Marshalls was reflected in the royal couple giving the Marshalls personally autographed formal pictures of each of them.18
The banquet was a truly festive occasion. Together with the royal couple and their son, Leopold, were leading members of the Belgian embassy and diplomatic mission. American officials included the United States Ambassador to Belgium, Brand Whitlock, State Department heads, military personnel, Chief Justice Edward White, cabinet members, and Senators Lodge and Hitchcock.19

There was one gentleman absent who would have been present most assuredly if President Wilson had been in good health, his executive secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty. But, he had not been invited. Perhaps he had been inadvertently overlooked. Perhaps he was one of several who had been refused an invitation because the number of Washington officials was too large for everyone to be present. Or, perhaps he was intentionally omitted from the guest list. If the latter was the case, by whom was he omitted? Tumulty was determined to find out, peeved by being ignored as much as Marshall had been offended by his humiliating experience during his welcome of the King and Queen at Hoboken. A letter to Mrs. Wilson's secretary, Edith Benham, conveyed Tumulty's mortification:

My dear Miss Benham:

I hope I am not unduly sensitive, but I must talk to someone or I will explode. Will you please tell me if it is a fact that the White House prepared the list of guests invited by the Vice President to the dinner tonight in honor of the King and Queen of the Belgians. The Secretary of State has just informed me that the list was prepared at the White House.

I have consulted Mr. Forster and he has informed me that it has been the immemorial practice that at these affairs the Secretary to the President should be included. The Secretary of State informed me that some of the names on the list had be dropped and that mine was among them.
Dr. Grayson told me today that he and Mrs. Grayson had been invited and I am wondering whether the White House dropped my name from the list or whether it was the Vice President. I do not care a snap of my finger about this matter, but if I have no rights, at least I have some feelings that ought to be respected.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Tumulty.

It is not known whether Tumulty ever learned who was responsible for refusing him entrance to the banquet. He considered that Marshall might have been the guilty party. His attitude toward the Vice President was not one of admiration (as reflected in his biography). Mrs. Wilson was a likely candidate for omitting his name since she had no special affection for her husband's secretary. Quite probably he was not invited because of space restrictions. He certainly took the matter personally. The strain of his dealing with the President's incapacity was making him unduly tense. Obviously, Marshall was not the only Washingtonian ill at ease in this crisis surrounding the President.

For the time being, Marshall absented himself from his duties with the Senators. Breckenridge Long recorded that Marshall told him being host to the King and Queen was responsibility enough without adding to it attendance at the Senate. "Too much Jekyll and Hyde for him," Long concluded. The burden does not seem to have been too great, though, for Marshall and his lady. The day after the banquet they and the royal couple took a cruise on the Presidential yacht, Mayflower, visiting places of historical interest and scenic beauty along the Potomac River and into the Chesapeake Bay. Being a substitute President certainly had its rewards.

The medical team of Grayson, Ruffin, and Stitt continued to issue bulletins on the President's health. Some two weeks after the President's second stroke the judgment, so
far as the public was to be allowed to know, was that Wilson was enjoying "a comfortable
day." His improvement was being maintained and there was no change in the treatment
being given him. "No new symptoms have developed," ran the latest bulletin on his
health.\(^{22}\)

Since the near-fatal occurrence Edith Wilson remained close to the bedside of her
stricken husband. Her social life had come to a virtual end. Only on special occasions
was she to be found outside the White House. One such occasion was the funeral of
Italian Ambassador de Cellare. Accompanied by her private secretary, Miss Benham, her
mind was obviously not on the matter which brought her to the church. "She looked
troubled," Daniels wore in his diary. The Marshalls were in attendance and sat in the
front pew near ambassadors from Latin American countries. A funeral was not the time
for conversation and the Marshalls chose not to approach Mrs. Wilson with anything but
a nod of recognition.\(^{23}\)

### IV

A great drama was occurring behind the social scenes of official Washington,
related to Wilson’s illness. Following the arrival of the Belgian King and Queen in early
October, Lansing returned to Washington from Hoboken and promptly telephoned Dr.
Grayson to ask about the President’s condition. The only answer he got was that his
physical condition was "bad." On Friday morning, 3 October, Lansing met Tumulty
shortly before noon. Tumulty was mute, though he implied by the use of his right hand
on his left shoulder that Wilson was paralyzed on his left side. In a short while Grayson,
upon Tumulty’s invitation, met the two men in the Executive Office. The three men then
went into the cabinet room and for almost one hour they considered what course of action should be taken should Wilson continue in his disabled state. Grayson shed no light medically, and Tumulty added nothing about the "illness." Lansing kept a journal of this experience: "We discussed the possible necessity of Vice President Marshall taking over the executive authority temporarily in the absence of precedents as to what constituted disability under the constitution. I remarked that of course in the event that Mr. Marshall temporarily assumed the duties of President there ought to be no change in the officials of the Government. At that Tumulty became excited and declared with much emphasis that he would not remain a day in office in case Marshall had to act for he would not serve under him.

On the following Monday, 6 October, the cabinet met together in the White House. All were present and none questioned the "right of wisdom" of their assembling without the presence of the head of state. At the beginning of that meeting the President's physician gave encouraging news which "seemed to indicate a speedy recovery." This being the case, for Lansing had no reason to doubt the prognosis of a professional, no attempt was made at this meeting to suggest Marshall's acting as President, in the words of the Constitution. In a 1937 interview with Newton D. Baker by Marshall's biographer, Charles M. Thomas, the former Secretary of War revealed that the Cabinet definitely "did not discuss the question of the devolution of the presidential duties upon the Vice-President." Josephus Daniels, however, in his diary entry of 6 October 1919, makes specific reference to the topic. Whom to believe? Daniels' immediate journal entry must take precedence over the memory of Baker eighteen years over time. At least one scholar, Arthur Walworth, has connected the Lansing-Tumulty-Grayson conversation
regarding Marshall with the cabinet meeting of 6 October. This conjunction, however, is speculative and makes a confusing situation even moreso. 24

Joseph Tumulty's account, contained in his biography, *Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him* (1921), agrees in substance with Lansing regarding the October 3rd meeting (though he does not assign a date). Tumulty relates that Lansing "sought a private audience with me" in the White House cabinet room during the critical time of Wilson's illness. The Secretary of State had found Constitutional support for suggesting the President be replaced by the Vice President (Article II, Section 5). Tumulty "coldly turned" to Lansing and said, "Mr. Lansing, the Constitution is not a dead letter with the White House. I have read the Constitution and do not find myself in need of any tutoring at your hands of the provision you have just read." Just then, according to Tumulty, Grayson walked in. "And I am sure that Doctor Grayson will never certify to his disability. Will you, Grayson?" The startled doctor agreed. He had not confessed to Tumulty that he had earlier urged Wilson to resign but the President refused. With pressure from others he acquiesced to the inevitable. 25 Again, this controversy was recorded by one man (Lansing) in his own memorandum shortly after the event and recreated by the other man (Tumulty) in his memoirs many months later.

Two years later Marshall was asked his opinion about Tumulty's account of his meeting with Lansing as printed in the 3 December 1921 issue of the *New York Times*. Marshall was at his vacation home in Scottsdale, Arizona, and the *Times* sent him a telegram to request his comment regarding Secretary Lansing's attempt to place Marshall in the President's Chair. Marshall's answer was short: "I have so far kept out of all this discussion and propose to continue. I have nothing to say." No one else cared to
comment: neither Baker nor Burelson nor Daniels, and least of all Lansing. William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce at the time, held that he never knew of such an attempt to oust Wilson. That seemed to be all the light there was so far as the principals were concerned. The incident remained in the minds of many for a time. Shortly after Lansing’s resignation as Secretary of State in February 1920, Marshall dared to comment on it in his own humorous way:

A couple sitting immediately in front of us [on the train] had been reading the latest news from Washington and they were discussing it very earnestly. The man seemed to believe President Wilson had acted for the best, but his companion heatedly expressed the view that Secretary Lansing could have followed no other course than he had throughout.

“Why, what else could Mr. Lansing have done?” the woman asked with some asperity. “Here the President was sick. A lot of big questions had to be talked over and there was the Vice President, who doesn’t amount to anything. The only thing Mr. Lansing could do, I tell you, was to call these Cabinet meetings, and I think he did the right thing.”

"There you have it in a nutshell," quipped Marshall, "The woman was right. I don’t amount to anything."

Throughout October 1919 the Vice President was suspected from all sides: by those who felt he ought to step in to take the reins of government in his hands, and by those who feared that he would do so. That the possibility was ever present of Presidential succession occurred to him as early as 1912, when he first ran for the office of Vice President. In a letter to a man from Baltimore Marshall conveyed what he might do along with his view of government:

The thought suggested in your letter that Governor Wilson may die during his incumbency in office is too frightful for me to contemplate. This thought involves a calamity to the nation. I believe that Governor Wilson will be elected and that he will live to carryout the democratic platform and to advise the Congress
of The United States from time to time as the Constitution authorizes him to do. If, unfortunately, I should succeed him, my conduct in the office of President would be the same as in the Governor's office.

Marshall went on in his letter to emphasize his view that it was the task of legislators to make the laws and of the executive to enforce those laws which are clearly constitutional. He ended his letter by writing, "I have protested for four years against the usurpation of authority by executives and I shall continue to protest." With his view of government expressed so strongly it would be revealing to see whether Marshall would act in accord with his principles in event of Wilson's death or permanent incapacity.

Within three days following the President's stroke Marshall had spoken anxiously with Secretary Houston. He had not been told anything about the President's condition and he was fearful lest he be thrust into that office. From a source close to the President the request was made that an individual incognito outside the White House communicate to the Vice President word of the potentially imminent death of President Wilson. The undercover procedure was employed with the view to preventing any official statement about Wilson's condition that might have grounds for evidence that the President was indeed disabled. Should such occur it would be easy for political opponents to maneuver Wilson out of the White House.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Wilson, according to her biographer, Alden Hatch, had suggested to one of the attending physicians, Dr. Dercum, that perhaps her husband should resign for the sake of his health and that Marshall should succeed him. Allegedly, Dr. Dercum influenced the bereaved lady to persevere with the present situation since "to have Mr. Wilson resign would be a bad effect on the country and on our patient. He has
staked his life and made his promise to the world to have the Treaty ratified. . . ."

Nevertheless, a decision was made to inform the Vice President of the real possibility that he might at any moment be called upon to assume the role of Chief Executive.

The man picked to enlighten Marshall was a Washington reporter, J. Fred. Essary, head of the Washington bureau of the Baltimore Sun. Tumulty told Essary of Wilson's true condition as it existed within ten days following his second stroke. As the president's secretary he was in a position to know the White House reporters, and believed Essary to be trustworthy. Essary later revealed, "Many of us [White House reporters] were informed in strict confidence of every detail of the President's sickness. We knew that he had suffered a mild 'stroke' while on the train approaching Wichita, Kansas. We knew that he had suffered a still more alarming stroke a few days after he returned, and we knew that his physicians and his family feared that any moment he might be stricken a third time and that such a development in all probability would be fatal. This information, given to us in the most confidential manner, only increased our uneasiness."

Obviously the Vice President of the United States had not even been given information on Wilson's condition, known already to the press!

As Essary gave the news to Marshall in the latter's office, the Vice President sat dumbfounded. His head was bowed in contemplation of what had just been said to him. For a long time Essary waited for a response, a reply, anything. Receiving none, he started for the door. He did not realize that he was the first person who had given Marshall honest information on the President's condition. Some years later Marshall saw Essary and apologized, "I did not even have the courtesy to thank you for coming over
and telling me. It was the first great shock of my life." Unhappily, it would not be the only one. 29

Mark Thistlethwaite, discovering the truth, pressed Marshall to face the facts: Wilson might die at any moment and he would then become President. The secretary suggested that Marshall be prepared to announce his intent to carry on the policies of the late President, to which the Vice President strongly asserted that "he would change many things." Thistlethwaite answered, "All right, change later, but first announce a continuation of the previous policies." Marshall refused to change his position. In his view "a Vice President might make a poor President, but would make a much poorer one if he attempted to subordinate his own mind and views to carry out the ideas of a dead man!"

The secretary continued to press Marshall. What if Congress declared the President to be incapable of continuing his duties? His stubborn superior retorted, "No, it would not be legal until the President signed it, or until it had a two-thirds vote, and a two-thirds vote is impossible." But what if the Supreme Court declared Wilson to be incapacitated? Marshall replied that that would not happen and therefore there was no point in considering the matter further. No, he would become President only if Congress, Mrs. Wilson, and Dr. Grayson were in common agreement. Marshall never believed that Wilson was mentally incompetent. Thistlethwaite remembered Marshall as saying, "I am not going to seize the place and then have Wilson--recovered--come around and say 'Get off, you usurper!'"

Washington was filled with rumor about what the Secretary of State and the Vice President might do at a critical moment of Wilson’s illness. Some people suspected that
Marshall would move into the Presidency and Lansing into the number two spot. New Hampshire Senator George Moses wrote to a constituent that President Wilson was suffering from "a cerebral lesion" and that even if he survived he would have no effect on anything. Amid the many rumors going about Washington Senator Moses included that Colonel House was on his way to the White House to induce Wilson to abdicate in favor of the Vice President. Certain Republican Senators saw their chance to overthrow Wilson and called on Marshall at his office to ask him if he would accept the presidency if the Senate declared the Presidential office vacant. Whereupon, Marshall got up from behind his desk, walked to the door opened it, and declared "Woodrow Wilson is the President of the United States and there is the door!" His visitors promptly departed.

Marshall reminisced years later, "Those were not pleasant months for me. The standing joke of the country is that the only business of the Vice President is to ring the White House bell every morning and ask what is the state of the health of the President. If there were a soul so lost to humanity as to have desired his death, I was not that soul. I hoped that he might acquire his wonted health. I was afraid to ask about it, for fear some censorious soul should accuse me of a longing for his place. I never wanted his shoes. Peace, friendship and good will have ever been more to me than place or pomp or power."

Who was the "censorious soul" Marshall referred to? Perhaps he had no individual in mind. The "censorious soul" might have been Tumulty; no one knows. Tumulty opposed any effort to place Wilson outside of the Executive Office for no matter how short a time. He was suspicious of Marshall, even repelled by him. Just as Tumulty feared the "overthrow" of his "Governor," so he feared his own loss of position and
prestige. His letter to Miss Benham regarding his being left out of the party assembled in honor of the Belgian monarchs reveals his considerable insecurity. Ira Smith has written that "Tumulty was as much cutoff from the President as any of us" as the weeks went into months during the illness. "I watched Tumulty grow more and more worried. He walked from office to office, picking up papers and putting them down again." "Ike" Hoover confirms this gradual estrangement of the secretary: "Tumulty tried hard to get to the President during all these months, but he was kept away."33

Was there real cause for fear by Tumulty that Marshall would seek to oust Wilson? From Marshall's standpoint there was none. So many Washington people talking about the President's alleged disabilities surely gave his secretary room for wondering. Perhaps he heard that the Chief Justice would give the Vice President a writ of mandamus just for the asking! It was only a rumor, it seems, but the rumor was published in the Christian Science Monitor.34

Marshall was firm in his position of "wait-and-see." He would have willingly become President, acting or actual, if he had been presented unassailable evidence that Wilson was unable to be President. He never was given any real information, and so did not act.
What historian Thomas A. Bailey has labeled "the American way of resolving deadlock by compromise" broke down with the Senate debates on the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. In the Nation's history often the spirit of compromise prevailed, as in the cases of the Constitution of 1787, of the development of a federal government during the Federalist-Republican era, of the acquisition of territory during the 1840's and, in some instances--but only for a time--of slavery in the territories. Compromises, "deals," were worked out during the period of Reconstruction following the Civil War and during the surge of growth near the end of the nineteenth century, particularly concerning relations between government and business. Politics itself has been called the art of compromise. Nevertheless, compromise did not prevent the Civil War, and compromise did not develop to allow the United States to become a member of the League of Nations.

The long debate was nearing its end by 21 October 1919. The Democrats supporting the Treaty found that in order to achieve their goal they would need to frame "reservations" of their own to counteract those of the Republican majority. The Democrats thus far had only forty-one votes against fifty-five of the opposition (forty-nine Republicans and six Democrats). Republican victory seemed inevitable. In an
address before the Indiana Democratic State convention meeting in October, the Hoosier Vice President exhorted, "Do you doubt that Republican success will be hailed at home and abroad as repudiation? Do you want the election returns celebrated in London and Paris, where Wilson is honored, or in Berlin and Vienna where he is hated?" The speech was decidedly partisan, designed to encourage support for the Democratic Party in Indiana as well as throughout the country.²

Yet, the lines were not drawn strictly in terms of the two parties. Some people had honest doubts about the treaty so far as the welfare of the United States was concerned. They did not want to compromise the sovereignty of their country. They wanted safeguards injected into the treaty. Some favored mild reservations; some favored strong reservations. Those who were the moderates wished to see the treaty passed in its basic form but with more specific statements which would protect American interests. In this group were a dozen Republicans whose partnership with the treaty proponents (Democrats) would have provided at least a comfortable majority of votes, though not the necessary two-thirds for ratification. Because Wilson did not compromise with them, they eventually moved toward the opposition position.³

Another faction was the "irreconcilables," those who were absolutely opposed to the League, including Senators Borah, Johnson, Knox, and Brandegee. These men held for defeating the ratification completely. No reservations were acceptable to them. They held positions of influence by being on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Filibuster was their strategy, and their threat was to leave Lodge's reservationist position for the Democratic one which wanted to defeat the Massachusetts Senator's reservations.
Following two hours of debate on 6 November 1919, the Senate seemed ready to come to a vote on whether or not to ratify the treaty. Senator Lodge requested unanimous consent for voting, when Senator Jones of Washington suddenly interposed an objection, thus preventing a vote. He had in mind that other Senators, who had voted against amendments, be given a chance to vote for the changes in the proposed reservations. Senator Underwood charged that it was first necessary to act on the resolution of ratification before considering the reservations, which could then be considered amendments to the resolution of ratification. Underwood was hoping to get in Democratic reservations before the ratification resolution was voted on.

Presiding over the Senate Marshall ruled against Underwood's point of order, a decision not pleasing to the Democrats, for the Republican reservations were allowed to remain with the Committee of the Whole. In explanation of his ruling the Vice President began by calling the subject in question "the most important treaty that ever was presented to the Senate of the United States. It involves far reaching consequences to the people of this country and to the people of the world." For Marshall the issue was above partisan politics and he did not intend to obstruct ratification of the treaty itself, with or without reservations. He did not intend to allow the treaty to be hampered or "pigeon-holed" by narrow interpretation of Senate rules of debate. The Senate President believed that the (Republican) majority should have the right to present its reservations for interpretations and that the other (Democratic) members of the Senate should have equal right in rejecting such reservations and substituting their own for Senate consideration.

Marshall saw the situation to be critical. United States foreign affairs henceforth would be determined by the action of the Senators. By his judgment Underwood could
try to substitute his own reservations before any vote was reached. The Republicans,
especially Lodge, made it clear that any such overt attempt by Marshall to give advantage
to the Democrats would be overruled. That night some forty Senators gathered with
Hitchcock, the leader of the Wilson force, to decide strategy to hold off an unfavorable
vote by the Republicans.  

On 15 November spokesmen from both the minority and the majority indicated
their expectation that "the treaty would be rejected on the final vote on the resolution of
ratification." Underwood threatened that his forces would reject the treaty before they
would vote for Lodge's reservations. The Massachusetts Senator countered that if such
were the case, that would be the end of the treaty. Instead, Democrats hoped to pass
through the set of even milder reservations and wanted Marshall to rule that such
procedure was acceptable under parliamentary procedure. Lodge's view still was
unchanged. To prevent filibustering tactics the Senate voted to close off debate
preparatory to voting on the treaty. With the cloture ruling the individual Senators would
have to speak their mind within the one-hour limit allotted.

On Wednesday, 19 November, the Senate was ready to vote on the Lodge
reservations. Many Senators had tried to have their reservations and amendments of the
treaty read before the period of cloture but without success. With cloture in effect
Marshall had to be the judge of whether remarks made by Senators on the floor were
pertinent to the speaking time and whether interruptions by other Senators should be
deducted from the time allotted to a speaker. During that week there was awkward and
heated parliamentary procedure due to the ruling, though after a while the Senators
adjusted to it. 6
What was needed by Wilsonians was for the Lodge reservations to be defeated, followed by a ruling by Marshall that would enable a vote to be taken successfully to reconsider a second vote on the treaty either without the reservations or with the Hitchcock (Wilson) reservations. If the Democrats were able to get support from the "mild reservationists," a two-thirds majority would result in a Democratic victory. If not, a deadlock would result and public opinion would then force a compromise to be worked out. This was the Wilson strategy, but it was unrealistic. He had not sufficiently courted the moderates. Furthermore, the Vice President was simply not in a position to command the situation. No matter what ruling he gave, he could be overruled by a simple majority.7

For five and a half hours that November day the Senate engaged in heated debate. At one point Democratic Senator Pomerene perceived that the core of the debate was the acceptance or rejection of the President himself. "It is not the treaty that is being considered so much by some Senators," he spoke out, "as perhaps it is one of the draftsmen of that treaty." The motion to ratify the treaty with Lodge’s reservations was defeated by 55 nays to 39 yeas, the majority vote coming from 42 Democrats and 13 irreconcilables.

Attempts were made to get an adjournment to prevent the irreconcilables from moving back to their own camp; they lost, 51 to 42. Marshall three times ruled to allow Hitchcock to move for a vote on the treaty with his reservations. Three times the President of the Senate was overruled. More motions were made, by Hitchcock and then by Lodge, but to no effect. Finally, Lodge permitted Underwood to move that the treaty be ratified without any reservation (what Wilson wanted in the first place). The result was a defeat for the Democrats (save seven); 55 nays to 38 yeas. Thus, the treaty was not
accepted with either the Lodge or the Hitchcock reservations. In fact, Hitchcock was
never even given the chance to secure a vote on his package. 8

To the Vice President’s mind "the long and weary months of discussion over the
Treaty was simply a waste of raw material." No one's mind was changed. No influence
of new information nor of public opinion nor of the possible effects of their action on the
world itself made any difference. "It was pride of opinion, as I saw it," Marshall
recollected. "There are those who have upbraided the President because he manifested no
disposition to accept any reservations to the Treaty. On the other side of this question it
may be stated that nobody knows whether he would have accepted them or not, because
the Senate of the United States never got itself to the point of tendering a ratification with
any reservations whatever." No one knows what would have happened had Wilson been
faced with the decision to accept or to reject the Senate’s decision. There would be yet
one more attempt to ratify the treaty, on 19 March 1920. For now, the first session of the
Sixty-sixth congress had come to a close. 9

II.

With the President still incapacitated, Marshall continued to act as Wilson's
personal representative on special occasions. On Armistice Day, 1919, the Prince of
Wales, heir apparent to the British crown, entered Washington as a national guest. For
weeks he had been discouraged from visiting the United States due to the President’s
illness and so had been touring Canada. With report of improvement in Wilson's
condition young Edward was able to fulfill his desire to visit America and to see the
President of the United States. The reception at Union Station near the Capitol was informal and warm with the Red Cross lasses eyeing the Prince and he noticing them.

In his first evening in Washington Edward was the guest of the Vice President in the frescoed dining room of wealthy Democrat Perry Belmont. Cabinet members and diplomats assembled around a horseshoe-shaped banquet table. With Mrs. Marshall unexpectedly ill, Mrs. Lansing, wife of the Secretary of State, stood in her place in the receiving line for the Prince. Over sixty guests were present, including this time the President's chief secretary, Joseph Tumulty, and his wife. During the course of the evening Marshall spoke of his dual role to Perry Belmont in a manner characteristically humorous, but underneath psychologically self-deprecating: "Tonight I am the President of the United States; tomorrow I shall be the elevator boy." 10

The Prince of Wales had no such reservations about himself. Everyone remarked during Edward's visit how well the young man conducted himself. Eleanor Roosevelt "marveled at the ways with which he conversed with older people. His usual neighbors at dinner were the Vice President's wife, Mrs. Marshall, and Mrs. Lansing, wife of the secretary of state. . . ." Marshall himself was "amazed at the restraint which these so-called blue bloods put upon their personal conduct." It required only a short time for the two men, generations apart, to win each other's respect. Careful not to give the impression of being a mere courtier, Marshall wanted at times to whisk the Prince away from favor-seeking individuals. 11

Host to the young prince on a brief tour around the Washington area on another occasion, the older gentleman chanced to be wearing a massive gold watch chain with a beautiful charm attached. His Fort Wayne Lodge had given it to him years before in
honor of his being awarded the Masonic Thirty-third Degree. The Prince looked at it, looked away, and finally asked to examine it. Marshall thought to himself, "He expects me to give it to him!" Feeling that the Vice President should do whatever he could to make visiting royalty happy, he offered his gold chain to the Prince. Edward was delighted. He accepted it as a gift, not knowing the pain Marshall felt in parting with that treasured remembrance.

Not long afterward the two men toured the Capitol building. As the Vice President showed Edward his Senate office his little ward, Morrison, toddled in, looked up at the young prince and asked in a trusting voice, "Who are you?" Marshall was moved by that moment: "Then I knew that the faith and trust of childhood are as essential to democracy as they are to entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven. When all mysteries were solved, all doubts removed, then I knew that what we each should look for in each other...were friendship and good will...It glorified this heir to the throne of Great Britain; it raised to kingship this little child from a humble American home." The man could not help and did not apologize for his sentimentality. It was of less importance that Edward was someday to become King of England than that his own cherished lad had become so important to him and not long after to die prematurely.12

III

With the din of battle behind him Marshall left the Capitol for speechmaking in various parts of the country. It was at Atlanta, Georgia, on a beautiful Sunday afternoon, 24 November 1919, that a cruel hoax was played upon the man and upon all gathered to hear him that day. The host of the Vice President on that occasion was a local civic
fraternity, the Loyal Order of Moose. The rest of the world was far away to the minds of the Moose of Atlanta. They did not know about the agitated Japanese inhabitants on the Chinese peninsula of Shantung nor about the adventurous exploits of the Italian poet Gabriele d'Annunzio along the Dalmatian coast nor about the tens of thousands of Jews recently murdered in the Ukraine nor that the young Prince of Wales was leaving for home after a happy visit to the New World. They did know that their President was very ill. The only news about his condition was contained in daily bulletins issued by his physician.

The auditorium was filled with an expectant audience as the Vice President stood before them. Committed to stirring up the vitals of a listless society in danger from materialism and anarchism, Marshall held before them the giant figures of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln--figures from the past, not dead but alive! Not like many men walking this very moment the streets of Atlanta, walking dead men.

While he was speaking to them, the telephone rang in the auditorium office. The party wanted to speak to the Vice President. But, the reply came, he was on the podium, addressing the audience. "Well, I guess he'll come now," said the unidentified voice. "President Wilson had just died in Washington and Mr. Marshall is wanted at once on the long distance."

The tragic news was taken to the podium. Marshall was interrupted with the whisper that Wilson was dead. In prayerful reflex he bowed his head for a moment. The audience was told the news, stunned into silence. The Vice President raised his voice with strain, "I cannot bear the great burdens of our beloved chieftain unless I receive the assistance of everybody in this country." The audience was moved: men bowed their
heads; some women cried audibly. The organist commenced playing the familiar hymn, "Nearer, My God, to Thee."

The speech was only half-finished. Marshall left the podium to call The Associated Press. No, the President was not dead. Marshall called the White House; trouble with the connection frustrated his efforts. And there he stood. The President was not dead, but for a few minutes Thomas Riley Marshall was President of The United States, at least to those people in the auditorium and to himself. The unknown caller was not identified, not even with the $100 reward offered by the Governor of Georgia.¹³

IV

The nearness of 1920, an election year, brought forth rumors concerning political offices and aspiring candidates. Unacquainted with the American scene, Paris newspapers learned from a supposedly well informed source of an alleged coup de theatre about to take place in Washington: the President was shortly to take a month's "vacation," and the Vice President would become Acting President during that time. The French viewed Marshall as decidedly pro-French: "His coming into power should reduce the resistance of all those Senators whose opposition to the treaty is based on personal grounds." Marshall's assumption of Presidential power was seen as only a temporary matter. His intimacy with the French Ambassador to the United States, Jules Jusserand, and his past statements regarding the protecting of French interests vis-a-vis German were good news to those across the Atlantic who wanted to see the United States in the League.¹⁴
In America some Democrats believed that Wilson and Marshall ought to be given the opportunity to choose a third term in office. Close friends of Marshall held that he was not intending to run as Vice President again, though as an Indiana Democrat he might run for the United States Senate. To find the truth of the matter the *New York Times* sent a reporter to Indianapolis where Marshall and his family had gone for the Christmas holidays. The Vice President was interviewed and left no doubt as to how he was feeling at that time: "I saw in the New York Times the other day that I might become a candidate for Senator. I am not running for the Senate. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for the Senate. I am fed up on the United States Senate." The reporter then asked him about the Presidency. He answered firmly, "I am not a candidate for any office and do not propose to enter any primary for the Presidency, but nobody knows, least of all myself, what course of conduct would be pursued in the improbable event of factional fights and inability in the Democratic national convention to make a nomination among the candidates which would receive the wholehearted support of the party."

Marshall appeared to leave open the question of whether he would be open as a draft choice by his party at a critical point in the convention. "For fifteen minutes at Atlanta I thought I was President of the United States. That fifteen minutes taught me that no man ought to seek the office, and that no man ought to take a nomination for it except at the imperative will of his party associates." He concluded, "It is a long time between now and next November. The road is rocky, and many an apple cart will be in the ditch before that time." Since he had not seen Wilson since his seizure three months before, Marshall really did not know whether Wilson would recover completely and run
for a third term. For him the truly frustrating fact was that Wilson was not running the government well!\textsuperscript{15}

Other Washington personalities were also persuaded that Wilson’s absence from the administration of the government had not done the nation much good. Just before Christmas, 1919, Thomas W. Gregory, now no longer Attorney-General, had confided his vexation to Colonel House, in the latter’s words, “the fact that Marshall was not made acting President when Wilson first fell ill,” since the President could no longer perform his duties. Similarly, foreign governments were uneasy in dealing with an administration whose leader was unavailable, at the very best, and unhelpful, at the very worst, in coordinating efforts among friendly nations to advance the cause of international peace, given the contentious debates in the United States Senate. Sir William Tyrrell of the British Foreign Office shared with House his government’s (unofficial) “indignation” at the state of affairs and went on to relate that Vice President Marshall had told him that he had not been able to see Wilson for two months. At the same time, Marshall added, there are “people [who] had access to him who should be properly in jail.” House wrote in his diary on 22 December 1919, “This is a strong statement and I wondered if Tyrrell repeated it accurately. Marshall expressed himself as being thoroughly tired of the delay in ratifying the Treaty and spoke with emphasis when he declared it would certainly be ratified within the next thirty days; that if there was an attempt to hinder it he, Marshall, would break his silence and make a public statement.”\textsuperscript{16}

Secretary Lansing was nearing the end of his tenure. He had conducted cabinet meetings periodically as second-in-command, as he felt that the business of government needed to go on by the assembling of the executive heads even without the presence of
the Chief Executive. This view became a bone of contention with the President. Wilson had been unhappy ever since he learned of Lansing's true opinion of the League. The Secretary of State felt that too much attention had been given by Wilson to the League, and at Paris Lansing made the mistake of sharing his view with William C. Bullitt, a young member of the American delegation's staff who later resigned out of disgust and disagreement with Wilson. The previous September Bullitt revealed to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate that Lansing also had forecast that the Treaty would not pass because of its implications for American sovereignty.¹⁷

On the seventh of February, 1920, Lansing received a letter from the President in which Wilson expressed his disapproval of the cabinet meeting without his summons. Consequently, Lansing set about to relay the communication to the various cabinet members, "and in compliance with the intimation contained in the letter there will be no meetings in the future unless summoned by the President himself." By then Lansing had made the decision to resign: "Thank God I shall soon be a free man!"¹⁸

On 13 February President Wilson had a White House conference with the House Labor Committee to discuss, no doubt, the current labor problems. This is the first recorded date in "Ike" Hoover's notebook of the President's having an appointed meeting since the time of his attack. The day had another significance for Robert Lansing: "Friday, the 13th! This is my lucky day for I am free from the intolerable situation in which I have been so long. . . . The President's irritation and jealousy, which are so manifest in his letters, make me wonder as to whether he is mentally normal. His complaints are so childish and his tone so peevish that it is hard to believe that his malady has not affected [his] mind. . . ."
Public reaction measured little. Private remarks by cabinet members were guarded. Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana wrote to his Governor, S. V. Stewart, that Wilson probably knew his cabinet was meeting or that from time to time some of them came together and so "share in the offense, if offense it was. It is rather humorous that Redfield, who is out, that Lane who is going out, publicly assume their just share of the responsibility, while the other fellows all keep very still." Herbert Hoover, former United States Food Administrator with the Wilson Administration, regretted Lansing's fate, for he had "high esteem" for him, whereas for Wilson, Hoover believed such "action was that of a very sick man."

For Lansing, elated by his "freedom," the past twelve months had been "a year of disappointment." It was that for others also: for Wilson, whose League had not seen life in the Senate; for Marshall, whose situation while not tragic still was emotionally burdensome with adversaries in both the legislative and executive branches; for the cabinet members, whose lack of leadership left them without executive direction; and for the American people, who were adjusting precariously to a postwar economy and to a new era in American life fraught with insecurity and intolerance.19
One last attempt was to be made in the Senate to ratify the peace treaty with Germany along with a document which contained provisions for a League of Nations that would include the United States. At the Capitol building reporters, waiting in the corridors to interview Senators, spied the Vice President. His gray eyes blinked and his voice seemed tired as he murmured, "Boys, why don't you just take your files on this treaty debate and print them over again." One newsman, writing of the encounter, depicted Marshall with the words, "And he passed, shaking his head mournfully." Reporters sensed that Marshall no longer had any fight in him to press Wilson's position upon the Senate. Certain Senators heard him say that he was disaffected by the strategy urged by the President.¹

On 19 March 1920 the Versailles Treaty failed to be approved. The vote for ratification simply did not have support of two-thirds of the Senators: 49 yeas to 35 nays. At the time of the vote there were 49 Republicans and 47 Democrats. Historian Thomas A. Bailey, following D. F. Fleming before him, once speculated that if Henry Ford of Michigan had beaten Truman Newberry in the 1918 race for the Senate, there would have been an equal number of Senators from the two parties. "The Vice President, a Democrat, would have cast his vote with the Democrats, the Foreign Relations Committee would have contained a majority of Democrats and would have had a Democratic chairman." The Michigan race was noted because although Newberry won,
he was later convicted of having borrowed too much money for his campaigning and for being unable to repay his creditors. He was subsequently pressured by public opinion into leaving his Senatorial post even though he had been freed on a legal technicality. In Bailey's words, "By such small margins is the course of history changed."² Be this as it may, votes did not follow along strict party lines, as most Democratic Senators discovered.

Marshall was by now in favor of America's involvement in the League of Nations. When the Democratic National Committee developed its platform the following summer at its convention in San Francisco, he wanted a plank included about the League. The crux of the question for him was this: Should the League covenant be accepted with or without reservations or should it be altogether rejected? To a reporter, he expressed, "The Democratic Party declares for the covenant without reservations. It accepts this gauge of battle. It pledges the people to ratify the covenant, and it further pledges the people that, should the workings of the League deprive the American people of any of their constitutional guarantees, it will insist upon the amendment of the covenant so as to safeguard their rights or to a withdrawal from the League."³ The core position was definitely Wilsonian, but the reservation was Marshall's as a result of his exposure to the views expressed in the Senate debates by the partisan reservationists. He never wanted America to enter into an unending alliance with European nations. In this respect he entertained the caution of a Lodge. Yet for the time being, during this period of transition from war to peace, he felt that the United States should join with other peoples to advance peace throughout Europe and the rest of the world. The United States was still technically at war with Germany.
The annual Democratic Jackson Day Banquet occurred in January of another Presidential election year. The candidates were present in person or by proxy. No decision had been made to identify the front-runners. It was too early for that. Marshall was more interested in what the Democratic Party would stand for than what candidates were to be offered to the American people. In a lengthy letter to his old friend from Fort Wayne, E. G. Hoffinan of the Democratic National Committee, Marshall requested that he be selected as a delegate-at-large to the 1920 San Francisco Convention. The basic issue of the Convention Marshall saw in terms of "how shall the Democratic party propose to rehabilitate the political system of America if entrusted with powers." The Vice President wrote, "The only sure foundation for a stable republic must rest upon the Jeffersonian doctrine of equal and exact justice to all men and special privileges to none. In no other way can the individual exercise his inalienable right to life, to liberty and to the pursuit of happiness." The letter was a careful exposition of his belief in the prerogative responsibility of the individual states to administer self-government. He had not changed his view since before his days as a state governor that the legislative branch was particularly responsible to its citizens while the executive branch was the legislature's arm of administration. A New York Times editorial was supportive of Marshall whom it called "a man of the prairies who imbibed early the principles of Jefferson and Jackson and has never forgotten them." The writer did not interpret Marshall's message as platitudinous polysyllables designed to impress: "If there is a public man in the United States whose word will be taken when he says he stands for these things, it is Thomas R.
Marshall. . . . Nobody has yet appeared as well qualified as the Vice President to state in plausible terms the longing of a great many American citizens to get back to where they used to be." The praise of the Times was quite in contrast to earlier editorial excoriation.

Marshall's name was offered for the Democratic Presidential preference ballot in Indiana. He denied to reporters that he was a candidate for the Presidency. His concern was to return his party's loyalty to "old representative democracy" from the "new socialistic democracy" he saw in current vogue. He was not a candidate for President in Indiana, and he explained that his being on the ballot there was to prevent someone from getting Indiana's thirty votes by default. The name of William G. McAdoo had been placed on the Indiana ballot, and quickly thereafter the Vice President's name was inserted.

By mid-May McAdoo was estimated by many to be the most favored candidate. Attorney General Mitchell Palmer was not liked by labor, which did favor McAdoo for his blessings while he was Director-General of Railroads during the War. Governor James Cox of Ohio was being given support by the machine bosses, including Tammany's Charles Murphy and Indiana's Thomas Taggart, and by William F. McCombs who had directed Wilson's campaign efforts in the 1912 campaign. A New York Times article had this comment: "With McAdoo foremost in the Democratic race and Cox being discussed as a strong contender, little is heard of other Presidential aspirants in the Democratic Party. At the same time significance is attached to the fact that, in Washington at least, there is an undercurrent of sentiment favoring Vice President Marshall." John Sharp Williams of Mississippi was asked what he thought of the Vice President as a nominee, and he replied that Marshall would be a satisfactory choice. As he indicated in a letter to
Marshall, it would be better for the Party if delegates went to the Convention
uninstructed.  

Marshall gave the keynote speech at the Indiana Democratic Convention on
20 May. His partisan oration reflected his views as Senate President when he sat, day
after day, listening to the Senators debate whether or not to ratify the treaty of peace with
Germany. He declared that the Republican-controlled Congress had done next to nothing
for the past twelve months besides debate the treaty in the Senate: "It has put in twelve
months of searching investigations of the most minute character and at great expense to
show that the victory which we won was really a defeat." He went on to say that
individual Democrats did not have to be of one spirit toward Wilson's view of the Treaty.
Wilson had made clear his opposition to any view which diluted his own version of the
peace treaty with reservations. In contrast, Marshall encouraged Democrats who opposed
the Wilson version to state candidly and without fear their viewpoints.  

He seemed tired in his adulation of the Wilson Administration. Claude Bowers
who sat next to him on the podium remembered: "It was common knowledge that
Marshall felt he had not been accorded proper recognition by the President. I am sure
there was some justification for his resentment. While we were engaged in a great war he
had not been invited to sit in the meetings of the Cabinet, and he felt he did not enjoy the
intimacy with the President to which his position entitled him." It is true that prior to
Wilson's illness Marshall had not been privy to the President's policy-making. From the
very beginning of their association in Washington there was friendly correspondence, not
many meetings together, and a bevy of progressive legislation to enact. But, later, the
War and after that the Paris meetings occupied the President's every waking moment. It
took two strokes and seclusion of Wilson before Marshall began to assume presidential
tasks, however minimal in significance. If we take Marshall at his word in terms of the
many times he spoke about his presence at Cabinet meetings, he believed that the
President of the Senate should not be privy to the conversations of both Congress and the
Administration.

After the Vice President had given his speech to the Indiana delegates, Bowers
arose to speak. Marshall as the temporary chairman had just given Democratic views on
national issues. It was now Bowers' turn as permanent chairman of the convention to
speak on state issues. Unbeknown to the delegates Bowers' real task was "to speak
almost exclusively on national issues, covering what Marshall had left out." The state
Democratic leadership earlier determined that the former Indiana governor was no
enthusiast for either Wilson or his League of Nations. Whatever Marshall was to say at
the Convention, it needed a firm follow-up and Bowers was the man to do it. He recalled
years later, "The Marshall speech was rather coldly received, and mine met with the
general approval of the crowd. We got a tremendous lot of applause. One time I looked
around and saw Marshall clapping his hands, too. I felt sneaky because I was afraid he'd
think it was intended as an answer to him." Bowers went on to speak warmly of Wilson
and the League of Nations. When he sat down at the conclusion of his speech, Bowers
recalled that "Marshall placed his hand on my knee and said, 'Claude, I've tried to help the
President, but he wouldn't let me.' To my embarrassment, I realized that he knew my
speech was intended to put in what he had left out, but if he felt any resentment he never
showed it and our friendship continued until his death. . . . Had Wilson retired when
incapacitated by illness, Marshall would have become President; I believe Wilson's
failure to step down rankled in the breast of the Vice President." Perhaps Bowers' judgment has truth in it, but Marshall's statements indicate that he never wanted to be President. He certainly never exerted effort toward that end. But, one is left with the lingering thought that if the right combination of factors had presented themselves to the Vice President, he would have agreed to become Woodrow Wilson's successor. The legend persisted among older Indianans who remembered the times that Marshall was resentful occasionally toward the White House. 8

From April through June, a nationwide poll showed McAdoo to be the leading contender for the Democratic nomination. The Republicans were having a closer race with Leonard Wood, Hiram Johnson, and Herbert Hoover leading the field. (Harding was far down the list.) President Wilson had not said that he was not interested in running again, and so his popularity was second only to McAdoo's. James Cox, the eventual winner, had only a third as many poll votes as did McAdoo three weeks before the Convention began. As a potential candidate Marshall was not out of the picture, but he hardly figured to achieve much strength. The machine bosses were pondering whether Marshall was worth the fight it would take to make him the Democratic candidate for President. If the platform came close to Marshall's political philosophy, there was a chance, they reasoned, that the Vice President could win. Still, McAdoo and Cox were leading the pack in the minds of many. But, to leave no doubt as to what the President thought about Marshall at this juncture Wilson sent a telegram to Homer Cummings on 12 June with the order to block the Vice President from "having anything to do with the framing of the platform." 9 If there were ever any doubt as to the relations between
Wilson and Marshall, at this juncture the relationship had been rent. The only question is whether Marshall was aware of it.

When the Republican National Convention in Chicago concluded on 12 June, it had chosen Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio as its standard bearer. Democrats were still divided, and the winner was not going to be an obvious one. Marshall, newly arrived in San Francisco, made it clear that he was not a Presidential candidate and was about to retire from politics. He expressed the view that Wilson did not want to run for a third term, though he could be elected if he wished to run. About Harding he said, "The Republicans are not so well pleased now as they were on Saturday night. Personally I have high regard for Senator Harding. I would do anything for him except vote for him." About himself he said, "I am an old man who has torn his hair for Bryan, slaved for Parker and done his hardest for Wilson, and I am about ready to retire from politics." There was no reason to doubt the sincerity of his words. 10

The morning papers for 19 June carried surprising political news. William G. McAdoo, ahead for weeks in the Democratic popularity contests, declared his refusal to run for President. He had supposedly never allowed himself to seek the nomination, and now he was flatly refusing to let his name be entered into the convention. Wilson had not declared himself a candidate either, but the convention was going to be a Woodrow Wilson convention at least so far as the platform was concerned.

Democrats were becoming more hopeful for various reasons. They thought they could best Harding, and the bosses were not unhappy to hear about McAdoo's decision. They felt that they could "muzzle" Bryan, if they had to, to prevent his extreme endorsement of the prohibition amendment. As Taggart sipped on his mint julep (non-
alcoholic, of course), he expressed to reporters his hope that he might be a United States Senator again as he was in 1916. When informed about McAdoo, he calmly stated, "You can say for me that means Mr. Marshall will be the next President."

Taggart, while disappointed in his failure to be re-elected to the Senate, was still the careful politician. He was wary of Marshall, one suspects, who weeks earlier complimented him in a backhanded way. Said the Vice President, "I think Tom Taggart made a good, clean competent senator. He is a businessman and believes in business methods and if we had had him here [in the Senate] during the war he would have done a great deal to see that things were run on a business basis. He likes to boss the name candidates, and all that, but he is not a candidate for office for the money he will get out of it. I can say that without hesitation. As far as politics goes, we have never played the same game and I have never followed his leadership. I do not believe in the kind of politics he believes in.""11

Despite the polls taken weeks before the Convention, it was anybody's guess who would end up the winner. Colby, Cox, Davis, Marshall, and Wilson were names bandied about. Wilson himself had done nothing to take his name out on consideration. McAdoo had known this, and he did not want to run against his father-in-law.

Taggart kept consistent with his story of support for Marshall, the choice of Indiana's delegates. In Chicago on his way to the West Coast, the Hoosier Democrat held that the liquor question was not a political issue, that Vice President Marshall would gain votes from the South especially, that if he still refused to run Indiana would split for Cox and Palmer, and that the League of Nations would be favored by the Convention.
Arriving in San Francisco, Senator Carter Glass of Virginia had his pocket filled with Wilson's rough draft of a platform for the Democratic Convention. He noted that McAdoo would probably end up with the nomination despite his earlier withdrawal of his name from consideration. Other party leaders felt that McAdoo was popular enough to be a winner. Senator Saulsbury of Delaware openly declared, "Delaware is for Marshall. Many Democrats in the country believe that the time has come for the party to have as a standard bearer a sane, conservative man who represents old-time Democratic policies. Such is Vice President Marshall. I think that the radical movement which swept the country during the war and for some time afterwards has subsided. The country needs in the executive office a man who will bring us back to first principles."

The unanswered question at the convention was "What does the President want to do?" Is he a candidate? Why hasn't he committed himself? How much influence does he really have over the convention delegates? Older campaigners liked neither the possibility of a third term nor the presence of "the Wilson regime" any longer than necessary. They believed the President to be too ill to run as a candidate. They wanted a man they could count on as a good party man, one who would give due "recognition to those who have borne the brunt of battle for democracy through weary years." Rumor had it that Wilson favored John W. Davis of West Virginia, the American Ambassador to Great Britain. Also, the convention was seen as taking on a conservative hue, reflective of disaffection with the sporadic radicalism within the country. For this reason Thomas Marshall or Champ Clark were relevant nominees in case of a deadlock.12

After a pre-convention rest in Del Monte, California, Marshall moved into the city of San Francisco to begin his strategy of harmonizing the party faithful. One of the
delegates invited him to "get away from it all," under a beautiful oak with no telephone, telegram, or letter in sight. "Why threaten a Vice President like that?" quipped the little man. "Why not take him to some place where he might get at least a letter from some one, sometime?" He did not get serious when a reporter asked him the old, familiar question: "I haven't the remotest idea of being renominated. I've been in Washington eight years. I've seen the wheels go round and met the great and the near great. Now that is about over and I have no expectation; there isn't a man on earth who can say I ever even intimated to him I wanted to be nominated for President." He still would not say what he would do if the Convention nominated him. "Any man can say what I have been, or I am, but God alone can say what I will be . . . ."

"I have been a good long time in politics, ever since I was twenty-one," he emphasized. "No, ever since I was eighteen, for it was then I rode a big black stallion at the head of a torchlight procession in '72, when Tom Hendricks was running for Governor . . . . I have always found the very worst of Democracy better than the best of Republicanism. I have served under every kind of leader and remained loyal to the party on the theory that I was not going to leave my father's house just because my father happened to be insane. I have been told that it is safer to be regular than right and that in the long run if you stay home and if you have any influence and are right you can do something toward getting your party right. I have believed that is better than running away from your father's house armed with a box of matches and seeking whom you may destroy." ¹³

The Democratic Convention in San Francisco lasted officially from 18 June to 5 July. Lois Marshall, told that her husband might become nominated if the deadlock
continued, replied, "He doesn't want it, but I can tell you that the party hasn't anyone as
good a vote-getter as its Vice President." She may have been right; she never got the
chance to find out, though at the time the Vice President's name was frequently
mentioned.14

The first ballot had been taken on the day before Independence Day. Three days
later balloting was still going on. Dark horse "booms" never occurred. It required forty-
four ballots for the Democrats to decide on James Cox. (Bryan, still the active politician,
went into despair with his party going for a "wet" candidate.) Franklin Roosevelt of New
York, the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, joined Cox as the Vice Presidential
candidate for the Democrats. Candidates and convention delegates endorsed the League
of Nations, and then they all dispersed to the far corners of the country.

2 November was Election Day. Cox seemed confident; Harding complacent. The
next day the Republican Senator from Ohio found himself elected President of the United
States. Only the southern half of the nation had voted Democratic, and that did not
amount to many electoral votes.

An era was fast fading. Two days after the election Woodrow Wilson moved his
wheel chair to the east portico of the White House to let the demonstrators for the League
of Nations see him from their position on the lawn outside. A reporter noted, "Looking
old and worn and showing plainly the ravages of his illness, the President made a pathetic
figure. He lifted his hat and his lips parted as if to smile, but his face seemed tense with
emotion." Bryan, older but still able, had a point of view about Wilson that he shared
with
the press. For him the situation was no longer the President's:
"The Lord hath given.
The Lord hath taken.
Blessed be the name of the Lord."

Mr. Wilson, Bryan suggested, ought to resign and let Marshall become President, a reward he deserves. Then, in December when Congress meets he should appoint Mr. Harding Secretary of State, himself resign, and let the Republican plan for world peace begin sooner than in March 1921.\textsuperscript{15}

Marshall did not feel the same way as Bryan. His judgment was that "The country will live to regret what it has done in the recent election. It is the greatest injustice of a century, and will bring one of the world's greatest figures to an untimely grave." What a word on Wilson!\textsuperscript{16}

II

The year 1920 was practically the end of Marshall's political career. Because he was the Vice President and because he was a potential candidate for the Presidency, he continued to be a favorite among organizations seeking notable and capable speakers. His words were weighty for those who thought like him, but they were getting shopworn in an age which was to experience great social innovation and material prosperity. With the blessing of the Republican Governor of Connecticut, the Vice President--on the fateful day of his little boy's demise--spoke before the New Haven Chamber of Commerce on "Reconstruction Policies." At this time he expressed the view that persons
of like interests join together for common goals and seek the support of the State toward achievement of those ends. Such an organization of like-minded men (businessmen, lawyers, unionists) has certain rights, for example, the right of redress of grievances. But, when the organization seeks its rights exclusive of other organizations, it has gone beyond the arena of societal concern. "Where are the men who used to believe... who used to think...?" He characteristically went "back," back to some distant past which must have been, which he remembered as a boy or as a young scholar at Wabash reading his Bancroft and Burke. Yet, it was a "back" that never really existed in the way he imagined it in his mind. The nation never stopped developing, never stopped challenging, never stopped anywhere.17

His national political position earned him a marble immortality. The sculptor, Moses Weiner, a Russian immigrant, had completed the bust of the Vice President which was on exhibit at the Corcoran Art Gallery in Washington before finally reposing in the main hall adjoining the Senate Chamber. In his memoirs Marshall could not restrain a humorous jibe: "There is, in the Senate wing of the Capitol, a bust of each of the vice-presidents of the United States. Why they have been erected there is not for me to say. I have always felt, however, that it was a sort of promise from each one to the American people that this was the last bust on which he should ever go."18

Periodically Marshall would say something that "rubbed" some people the wrong way. Even at this time he aroused the ire of Frank Noyes, President of the Associated Press. Exactly seven years after his bout with the New York Times concerning the predatory predisposition of many businessmen, Marshall told the nation's reporters at the Waldorf (same place!) in New York that he was for free press and for free speech, but
those who were not and who abuse those rights ought to be legally punished. He enjoined the newspaper editors to print good news, "the things that are helpful," instead of emphasizing the crime news. The Vice President viewed the function of the American press as not only being news gathering but also being "the sounding of a clarion call for every man to stand by the Constitution and the maintenance of the principles upon which the Republic was founded."

As if to answer the allegation of the Vice President, Noyes followed with the view that the purpose of newsmen is to "give adequate and truthful record of the day's world happenings free from bias and from opinion or propaganda." Against critics and reactionaries, he held, the press should exercise "good-natured tolerance."

Not unexpectedly, an editorial appeared in the New York Times which politely reprimanded Marshall who, however, did make "a speech full of sound doctrine and good advice." The words had a familiar ring: "When he discusses the conduct of newspapers, however, he falls into several too common mistakes, and not only tells the editors to do what they shouldn't, but also not to do what they should. And, apparently, either he does not read the newspapers as carefully as he should or else he reads the wrong ones." The point was made that the Vice President seemed not to have considered newspaper publicity about crime not only news to the citizenry but a deterrent to the criminal.19

Wall Street's Finance and Commerce came out in favor of the Vice President's criticism of the American press and offered that the New York Times' defense was weak. The Times editorial agreed that "the papers give too much space to crimes and divorce suits." But, the businessman's bulletin believed, the deeper issue concerns to what extent, if any, "regrettable" matters should be presented. Ignoring crimes would not eliminate
them and certainly ignoring them would be ignorance leading to false security. "Who most fears publicity?" The answer is, the man who has something to hide. Sacco and Vanzetti may have, if they were actually guilty of murder and of anarchistic intentions when arrested the following month in Braintree, Massachusetts. The evidence that convicted them the next year was flimsy, but their political ideology was not respectable, and these may have determined their guilt. In an article published in 1922, Marshall mentioned the case of Sacco and Vanzetti. He did not criticize them, but he lambasted the "radicals" who advocated "lawlessness, anarchy, and class-hatred." 20

III

When Marshall learned that Calvin Coolidge, Governor of Massachusetts, had been elected as the new Vice President, he sent off a wire that said, "Please accept my sincere sympathy." The Vice President was not above joking about his office. It is the mark of a mature man who can see himself, his office, and his relations with others in a realistic light. Marshall did and in the humorous manner that was a part of him.

The Vice Presidency had been a "joke" since the days of the first one, John Adams, when some Virginian said under his breath that Adams ought to called "His Superfluous Excellency"! (The label was made in light of the title which was applied to President Washington for a time: His Excellency.) Closer to Marshall's time was the comparatively colorless Charles W. Fairbanks. He presented a picture of a prude in a silk hat, of an immobile face with formal whiskers, and of a teetotaler who got embroiled in a
controversy with his (Methodist) church for the "buttermilk cocktails" he served to Theodore Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{21}

The nation's Vice Presidents have held rather enigmatic positions because of their dual role in government: one foot in the executive branch and the other in the legislative. Marshall's very real endeavor to be as useful as he could be in both branches proved at times quite frustrating. His official life was not betrayed or revealed by the humorous remarks he habitually made, such as: "I am myself a man of leisure—for that the American people are to blame. They put me in the one constitutional office erected to leisure and dedicated to laziness." To a friend who asked him what his responsibilities in office were, he replied, "I have my breakfast, put on my frock coat and plug hat, call on the White House and ask how the President is (they say he's fine), and I go back home, take off my clothes, and have the rest of the day to myself!"\textsuperscript{22}

His own humor aside, Marshall did take the Vice Presidency seriously. Hearing that the new President planned to have his Vice President attend cabinet meetings, Marshall felt this action would be unwise and would mitigate against favorable relations with the Senate. Coolidge would be subject to suspicion and deviousness by the Senators who would not make his job an easy one.

His final days in office were comparatively easy. The storms of the past were over; the Wilson Administration was on its way out. The words were sweet between himself and Josephus Daniels. Marshall hoped that Daniels would visit him later in Indianapolis, and Daniels extended a similar invitation to the Vice President: "You will always find the latch-string on the outside and the best jowl and greens and buttermilk Raleigh can offer when you will do us the honor to come to see us."\textsuperscript{23}
An admiring Senate presented him with a two-foot-high loving cup. Smaller gifts included a gold cigar holder, "enough fine Havana cigars to last him a month or more," and a silver case for his glasses. As spokesman for the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge remarked, "I desire to assure you--and I know I speak in behalf of all Senators--that we all feel deeply our sense of your unfailing kindness to each one of us and the thoroughly human way in which you have always dealt with us." The minority leader, Senator Underwood, emphasized the symbolism of the gift the Senators wished for him, "a reminder always of the love, friendship, and confidence of all the men who have served with you during this great era and during your incumbency as Vice President of the United States."

His eyes watered as it came his turn to speak. The lines on his face were more pronounced, and his bearing seemed burdened. He tried hard to begin his words:

"Senators, I can hardly be expected to voice the emotions of this moment. I do not forget the day I came to you when, as a tumultuous Indiana politician, I looked askance upon the Senate of the United States, and when, I fear, the Senate of the United States wondered what the American people meant in such a choice as they had made.

"This has been a great school for me, a school of my old age. It has taught me that there is not a man in this body who is not a double man, a man who has a brain that he devotes exclusively to the determination of the great problems which from time to time confront the deliberations of this body. But underneath that man of brain there is another man, the man of heart. And I have found in the eight years of deliberation with the United States Senate that the heart is wiser than the intellect and works with swifter hands and surer feet toward wise conclusions."
"Others may have what they will, but for me--may I call you brethren?--I shall not forget your generosity, your patience, your overlooking of the faults and foibles of a too often ill-tempered man. I shall not forget the friendly handshakes or the generous elbow-touch of humanity. I shall go remembering all these generous years and be content with the thought that if I cannot have greatness I can yet retain friendship.

"Senators, as all evil comes to an end, so all good times cease. Ours has ended. May the man who takes my place learn to know that beneath the bitterness of partisan controversy in the United States Senate there is a warm, human, loving heart that seeks, after all, only friendship and good-will. I thank you."

Their President sat down. Everyone to a man arose from his seat, "and the demonstration started."24

IV

The scene in the House of Representatives on 4 March 1921 was reminiscent of eight years before when a new administration was about to be inaugurated. Whether President Wilson would be present was not known. The galleries were filling with spectators. The announcement by the Sergeant-at-Arms that the Vice President-elect had entered caused a hush as Coolidge and Marshall walked side by side down the aisle. Warren Harding following behind and alone indicated that Wilson was not to be present at the inauguration of the new Vice President.

Before administering the oath of office to Coolidge, Marshall spoke a few last words to the Congress: "While the old order endures let representatives represent the old ideals: Let it be understood that they are not mere bellboys subject to calls for legislative cracked ice every time the victims of a debauch of greed, gambling or improvidence feel
the fever of frenzied need." A female observer in the gallery, Frances Keyes, was impressed: "I listened with a sense of bewilderment as Mr. Marshall, the retiring Vice President, involuntarily 'stole the show' from Mr. Coolidge, the incoming Vice President, by making one of the most moving speeches ever delivered in Washington..."25

The next day Marshall cleared out his belongings and mementos of office. The last day's mail included a handwritten letter from a man who had played a leading role in defeating the entry of his country into the League of Nations, William Borah, one of the irreconcilables. Borah had entered the Senate in 1907 and would remain there until 1940. He was of a different party from Marshall and of a different political persuasion regarding the place of the United States in world affairs. He was also what Marshall would call "a man of heart." Borah admitted that he had not met a man for whom he had any "greater regard and warmer friendship" and that others, some even whom he did not know, shared his judgment. He repeated his earlier word to the Vice President that his farewell address was "noble." He hated to see him leave.26

It was an admiring letter. It was also sad. The good times had ended. Friends were parting. That very morning Champ Clark's funeral had been held in the hall of the House of Representatives. Marshall was still strong of body for a man of sixty-seven years, a man far stronger than Woodrow Wilson whom illness and circumstances prevented from experiencing the kind words from men who sat on both sides of the aisle in the Capitol.

"The Little White House," or Wardman Park Inn in Washington where the Marshalls once lived for a summertime, was taken over by the Calvin Coolidges. Mrs. Marshall was regarded warmly by her friends who were convinced that Mrs. Coolidge
"could never take her place in our affections." Lois Marshall was revered and would be remembered as the first president of the Ladies of the Senate, organized in 1917.27

Reporters would miss the amiable Vice President from Indiana. Claude Bowers' estimate was that Marshall "had something of the eternal boy in him which reminded me of Barrie's Sentimental Tommy and Peter Pan." In his own quiet way and in his fondness for stories Marshall was friendly with the newsmen, and if he did not have an item of news he would tell them a funny story. This characteristic had made a problem for him. His close friends resented that "downtown" they (the Administration) referred to him as a "funny guy." Charles Albert, originally from Richmond, Indiana, was the New York World's Senate reporter for many years. In conversation one day with John C. Mellett, also a Hoosier reporter with The World, Albert said, "John, Tom Marshall is the smartest, ablest man that Indiana has sent to Washington, in ANY capacity. It is a dirty shame that downtown don't make use of what he's got--which is a damsite more than any of the so-called big boys have got!" Mellet many years later reflected, "Throughout his eight years as Vice President Mr. Marshall bore himself with a sort of quizzical dignity and seemed to be touched not at all by the slights from downtown where his fellow-Democrats foregathered to politick! And I agreed then, and still do agree, with the dictum of old Charles Albert!"28

William G. McAdoo was one of the "downtown" group who huddled close to Woodrow Wilson, even to becoming one of his sons-in-law. McAdoo perceived the outgoing Vice President truly if not completely. Marshall was "one of the picturesque characters in Washington." McAdoo imagined Marshall "sitting with a swarm of cronies in a country grocery-store telling stories." He did do those kinds of things and enjoyed
them tremendously, whether in Columbia City, Indiana; Scottsdale, Arizona; or at the
corner barbershop in Washington D. C. 29

There was no question but that Tom Marshall wanted to put Washington and
Wilson behind him. He had more life to live and more time to be his own man. In a last
letter to Daniels he revealed, "I am glad to get out of this life for I so love peace that very
frequently I do not fight for my own convictions as I should. And yet, as the days have
gone by, I am more and more impressed that good things must come from the individual
and not from the state." 30
Faced with finding a new income and perhaps a new career Marshall considered his available options. He could return to his hometown of Columbia City and become a country lawyer again. He could work in Indianapolis as an organizational executive, for the Indiana state capital would be receptive to having an ex-Vice President in its midst. Mark Thistlethwaite suggested to Marshall that he use his considerable talent to write magazine and newspaper articles. A dollar a word for a one-thousand word essay appealed to the thrifty Marshall. After all, he had not fared poorly as a public lecturer while in Washington and, whenever out of town, he had come to know the cunning ways of the Chautauqua circuit. As William Jennings Bryan had been his mentor in the public speaking business, so Marshall had given advice to Josephus Daniels on how to deal with lecture agents regarding compensation of services. But, writing for a living—that had real possibilities.¹

The realistic style of the post-bellum generation of American writers, which included the then unsung Theodore Dreiser of Terre Haute, was beginning to capture the emotions and imaginations of an America accustomed to flowery oratory and richly embellished literature. With his own considerable attachment to Victorian vision and verbiage Marshall was subtly influenced by his Indiana writer friends Meredith Nicholson, Booth Tarkington, and James Whitcomb Riley who by their example had achieved increasing recognition for their talents.²
Marshall's reputation as a governor and a Vice President caused the American public to be attentive to his words. His concerns awakened in many a nostalgia for what they wanted to recover from their past. Between 1908 - 1921, his written articles appeared in such popular magazines as The Atlantic Monthly, Forum, Hearst's International, The Independent, and Woman's Home Companion, and in the more professional and prestigious American Law Review and Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, to say nothing of numerous college and university publications which contained his addresses given at convocations and commencements.

I

While he looked forward to creative and reasonably lucrative activities in the post-political period of his life, he exercised caution as to his involvement. At age 67 he was no spry senior citizen, but he was also not ready to retire.

With the Republicans in office again, following an eight-year interlude, it seemed to them appropriate that America should honor the greatest of Republican Presidents, Abraham Lincoln. Accordingly, a commission was created and funds approved for planning a statue or a building to honor the Civil War leader. Like Marshall, Lincoln had enjoyed his boyhood in Indiana, and from his own youth Marshall could vaguely remember that he once sat upon the great man's lap during a senatorial debate in Illinois, but that was a long time ago, 1858.

Harding was in office barely three weeks before he communicated to his former Senate friend that he wished him to be included on the Lincoln Memorial Commission.
In response Marshall wanted to know whether there would be many meetings to attend and whether compensation for travel would be provided. Harding answered that "the meetings of the Commission are very few and there is nothing to indicate that the attendance in compulsory." Compensation for travel would come out of the building fund. The ex-Vice President did not jump at the offer, apparently, but after two months of consideration agreed to become a commission member "in place of Champ Clark, deceased." One year later the joint work of sculptor Daniel Chester French and architect Henry Bacon was dedicated by a grateful government, to use Marshall's words.

American adulation of Abraham Lincoln bordered on the religious. Indeed, the building itself was modeled on the Greek temple style and an inscription over French's artistry revealed the religious feelings of a people toward a "man who not only knew himself, but knew America." Marshall was pleased to have had a part in the completion of the Lincoln Memorial despite his early reservations.

Harding must have been pleased also, for he asked Marshall to consider a second assignment. The business orientation of the Republican Administration provided support for American economic development which had been stimulated by wartime profits. Industries, nevertheless, had to adjust their momentum to a postwar economy. Production decreased for a time and therefore wages were reduced. By the spring of 1922, coal miners from Pennsylvania to Illinois and southward went out on strike, some engaging in riots. A special committee was appointed by President Harding with the objective to study production and labor relations in the coal mining industry. With John Hayes Hammond, a respected mining engineer, as chairman, Harding asked Marshall if he would lend his name and talent to the fact-finding coal commission. Marshall again
inquired about the compensation afforded commission members. Harding assured him that "members of the Commission could work at the same pay" accorded members of Congress. He ended by saying, "I really think you will find it an interesting work, and that it will afford you an opportunity for a very genuine service to the country." While by this time, the fall of 1922, Marshall has moved back to Indianapolis, he agreed to commit his energies to investigating the coal industry. The commission would have a capable staff of civil servants to assist in the study.

Publicity on the appointments of the commission members focused national attention upon the problems of the coal miners as well as on the industrial magnates. The commission investigated alleged infractions of civil rights of the miners and the royalty scale appropriated by mine owners. Marshall was quoted as saying, "Owners of some of the anthracite deposits are taking a royalty from coal mined on their estates as high as they jolly well please." He looked to legislation that would curb the mercenary appetites of the mining magnates. With other commission members and staff he journeyed to Birmingham, Alabama, to make an intensive inspection of the mines and methods used to extract the coal. Their study was completed in the summer of 1923, at the time of the death of Warren Harding. Marshall's efforts were consequently recognized by the new President, Calvin Coolidge.4

II

For three full years following his public career the former Vice President wrote a column for the Washington Star, along with articles now and then in other newspapers
and magazines. (Mark Thistlethwaite, his secretary through the years of Marshall's governorship and vice-presidency, returned to his first love, news reporting, and was hired by the Washington bureau of the Indianapolis News.) Time marches on, and the concerns of Thomas Riley Marshall were current with the passage of time. There was no gag over his mouth to prevent his revealing news and views from the recent Wilson era, and people read his words with hopes of finding something exciting about the previous Administration.

One hundred forty articles appeared in the Washington Star for thirty-four months following Marshall's departure from the Senate. They contained his observations and opinions on current events, allusions to his Hoosier background, anecdotes from his days as state governor and as Vice President, and axioms on life in America. He took full advantage of his new role to speak his mind about the society and the world in which he lived. He was an elder statesman, a man who had served his President loyally, a person who had been privileged to meet and befriend some of the great personalities of his public years.

Marshall continued to uphold the image and ideals of former President Woodrow Wilson, at least in public. One instance was Wilson's early refusal to enter his country into conflict with another power on the grounds that America was too proud to fight. Marshall esteemed Wilson to have been "as valiant as the most warlike man in America. He was well within the line that separates the gentleman from the bully when he held that a proud and self-reliant man may well be content to suffer even an intended insult rather than to lower himself to the level of the man that offers it." Still Marshall was fearful that a consistent position of pacifism would lead a nation into military impotence. He warned
that "there is danger of our passing the point of being too proud to fight and of declaring we will not fight. . . ." While these words applied to international relations, they could just as well be descriptive of Marshall's conflict between what he felt to be right and his devotion and obedience to his President.

A friend once asked him, "What is your appraisal of Wilson?" After a protracted pause, Marshall admitted, "No human being ever lived with a higher aspiration for humanity, but he has lived a life so sheltered that he cannot believe that a man in a public office could be dishonest. At a cabinet meeting once someone said, 'Mr. President, there's graft in the aircraft division!' Wilson replied, 'That is impossible!' Marshall concluded, "If Wilson had tried as many cases in justices court as I have and heard witnesses lie like horse thieves under oath, he would have known better!" 5

An idealist might find it hard to see Wilson as a strong intellect and at the same time a poor judge regarding human beings. Robert Lansing was less kind than Marshall concerning Wilson's judgment of others, particularly lawyers, who constituted most of Wilson's cabinet positions. In his private journal Lansing reflected, "As I see it, President Wilson's dislike for lawyers as advisers was due to the fact that they examined a matter critically and in detail. He did not seek their advice as to the soundness of his judgment, but only as to what could be urged in support of it. The consequence was that Mr. Wilson avoided lawyers who did not consider him to be a sacred oracle, a fountain of absolute wisdom. As for lawyers of the other sort he had a profound contempt apparently considering them intellectually defective or dishonest. . . ." Wilson, however, could conceal feelings of affection or contempt in a communication even as he was adept at adoring or damning a person, be he lawyer or layman. 6
Marshall had known the three “progressive” Presidents, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. There were qualities in these men which he admired, but saw them to be no better than the plain American. They were, after all, human. By this same token he was not comfortable with the way Americans regarded their President. They were overawed by him. To Marshall, they seemed to be content to allow him to dictate policy which was not his prerogative to do. There was balance intended among the three branches of government. Because of this the President's "will is not to be impressed upon the American people." He is responsible to see that the minority are treated as justly as the majority. That is his job.\(^7\)

Soon after Warren G. Harding became President, Marshall wrote on the traditional American dread of absolutism. He saw irony in "the great delight that the American people take every four years in electing a limited monarch." After the Republican victory in November of 1920, instead of the newspapers printing comments on the Republican party platform, they insisted upon printing "statements in flaming headlines of what President Harding proposed to do." The newspapers and the people, both, focused on the Chief Executive, observed Marshall. Presidents would usurp and Senates would "oligarch" just as long as the people allowed them to do so: "Whether the world has been made safe for democracy or not will depend pretty much upon whether people in it desire to be democrats."\(^8\)

With regard to the Congress Marshall attributed both favorable and unfavorable characteristics. With tongue-in-cheek he marveled, "One of life's little mysteries to me is why the people permit the wise and good to stay at home to loaf on the public square, whittling a pine knot and cursing their government, and then by deliberate choice send
their knaves and fools to Washington." Marshall did believe that in the main
Congressmen were honest, that they all sought justice, but one would hardly suspect this,
he mused, to hear the electorate!\(^9\)

Being a lawyer, Marshall was knowledgeable about Constitutional law. He
defended the Supreme Court against Congressmen who would seek to weaken its
traditional role. At times the Court would declare certain pieces of Congressional
legislation to be unconstitutional. The fault lay, Marshall believed, with the Congress and
not with the Court. Congressmen needed to spend more time observing the oath they
took to support and defend the Constitution, instead of seeking to alter it or to frustrate it.
Let the Congressmen take the time and trouble, he admonished, to learn whether
Constitutional questions were involved before they act so quickly to pass legislation. If
they wanted the Constitution changed, then they must work in concert with the states.\(^10\)

The Senate of the United States Marshall esteemed to be composed of men of
good and practical intent who listened with care to the diverse voices of their constituents.
In his news articles he observed that "changing conditions at home change mental
attitudes in Washington." As he saw it, "The science of government often seems to be the
art of satisfying the people." Marshall remembered that when he first became President
of the Senate there were still "a few gentlemen of the old school who were deeply
impressed with the dignity and responsibility of their high office." None of them attacked
the honor either of the State of the Union or of a fellow Senator's motives; it was a thing
unheard of.\(^11\)

Upon occasion some Senators desired to amend the rules of procedure in order to
cut off debate upon a particularly controversial subject. Usually it was the majority group
who wished to end debate and thus insure a speedy vote in their favor. One example was the filibustering of Secretary McAdoo's shipping bill. Marshall reflected that the public's interest was not adversely affected by filibustering. In fact, he reflected, "I can think of no instance in which the people were injured by the failure to enact legislation because of filibustering tactics. . . . It is the stuff that slips through Congress easily that rises up thereafter to vex the state—the stuff complacently consented to. Filibusters, taking them by and large, have not wrought injury to the people." Where the public could be hurt, he informed, was in the executive sessions of the Senate, for there plays the egoism of men, publicly displayed for all to see. Such happened with the debate on the Versailles Treaty. As a result, any real discussion was frustrated, any modification of that treaty failed to emerge, and any chance for the United States to become an active member of the League of Nations was denied existence. 12

The memoirs of Marshall contain numerous anecdotes and character descriptions of the Senators whom he came to know. Of the some 160 who sat in the Upper House between 1913 and 1921, seventy Senators are mentioned in his Recollections. Typically, he said nice things about those men. Paragraphs on two senators whom Marshall did not respect were not included in the final copy. Marshall had no desire to touch upon or dwell upon controversial situations in his book. His foreward reveals, "This book is not intended to turn the tides of history nor to change the opinion of men as to the great things which took place when I was in public life." Perhaps he thought that if one were all that interested he could go to the Congressional Record to read the deliberations and draw his own conclusions. Since he was a Democrat, it is not surprising that more Democrats are discussed, but many Republican Senators were friends of the Democratic Vice President.
Despite the efforts of the Wilson Administration to involve the country in a league of nations and despite the efforts of opposition forces to prevent America from compromising its sovereignty in the name of "peace," nations in the postwar world were apprehensive lest another great conflagration develop and consume the peace so recently achieved. A resolution by Senator Borah in December, 1920, that Congress call an international conference on disarmament, found Congressional acceptance by the end of June the next year. Though Harding wanted time to develop as strong a navy as possible, he acceded to Congress's wish. On 11 August 1921 through its State Department the United States formally invited major and minor powers to Washington to discuss limitations of military arms which had been produced in such abundance in the recent war and to consider potential problems in the Pacific area. The Washington Conference took place between 12 November and 6 February 1922.

Following the decision of Congress for such talks, Marshall reminded his newspaper readers that such a commission had been envisioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations. That the call for a conference had now gone out was "a strong and very potent argument for the adoption of the covenant." He was in sympathy with the proposed conference. Along with many people he worried about the potential dangers of the recently renewed Anglo-Japanese treaty which theoretically opened the possibility for war between Great Britain and the United States. He regretted the outcome of the debate on the Versailles Treaty in the Senate and also the provisions of the treaty itself as it left the hands of the delegates at the Peace Conference. He did not want unhappy consequences for the disarmament conference. Just as Wilson had desired "open covenants openly arrived at," the first of his famous Fourteen Points regarding the
postwar peace conference, so Marshall hoped there would be no under-the-table dealings at Washington among the delegates. He was not optimistic, but he was hopeful.\textsuperscript{13}

The former Vice President could not help but compare the earlier conference at Paris with that at Washington. For Marshall, Wilson's "solemn referendum"--the issue of the election of 1920, whereby the people were to indicate their support or not of the League of Nations by voting for the Democrats--was "an unfortunate experiment." Marshall held that although the record shows that by their support of the Republicans the American people rejected the Covenant, he did not believe that the electorate really seriously considered the question. He wrote, "I am now no more convinced than I was before the election that there was any danger to the American people in our joining the League and I am just as convinced that our entrance would have been good in the cause of peace." The people must stand behind President Harding, he advised, even though they did not stand behind President Wilson. If the conference in Washington should fail, heaven forbid, "then America should turn to the league."\textsuperscript{14}

While the disarmament conference was taking place, Marshall thought about past remedies prescribed for the ills of mankind. He remembered the social Darwinist view of the strongest nations surviving. Wars had been caused by national pride, he added, but no one had ever found a remedy for conflicting nationalism. Nations must recognize their differences and their ethnocentrism, he emphasized, and thus be willing to work together in spite of them. Marshall was pleased that there seemed to be more tolerance of racial differences than in times past, and felt certain that world opinion would force government to hinder "any government that might attempt to plunge the world in the woes of armed conflict." The time had come for the United States to be sincerely concerned and
involved for the peace of the world and no longer to be isolated from the world. This viewpoint was contrary to the Republicans, for they officially condoned an isolationist position for the United States. By now there were no strong Democratic or Republican progressive leaders to attract a following sufficient to overcome the isolationist intransigence. Informing the American people about the new postwar world seemed to Marshall a worthy calling. 15

III

In May, 1922, the Marshalls sailed with friends to England. From there they were to travel between London and Edinburgh, thence to Paris, to Lausanne, Switzerland, for an international conference of Freemasons, thence to Rome, and then northward to Germany to see the Passion Play at Oberammergau in Bavaria. By the end of July they would return to Washington. 16

Upon arrival at London a luncheon was given in Marshall's honor by the English-Speaking Union, an Anglo-American organization of private citizens. The former Vice President offered that he was standing before them as a private citizen and not as a representative of the United States Government. The central concern of the group was peace, and he indicated that "he would follow any man anywhere, in any country, who stood for arbitration rather than for armed conflict. (Cheers.)" The American visitor knew his audience was probably concerned that his Government was not officially represented at the League of Nations meeting in Genoa. There were political and economic reasons for American non-involvement. Marshall offered a further reason: "The religious reason for not going to Genoa or the Hague was that there were so many
people in America who were opposed to having anything to do with a Government which had overthrown God, destroyed the home, and paralyzed the individual." Russia, everyone knew, was not invited to the arms conference in Washington because the United States had refused to recognize that country after the Bolshevik Revolution. 17

Traveling through London Marshall was impressed by the industriousness of the urban workers. Too often attention has been given to the “great men”, he subsequently penned, and too little written on the need for common people to aspire to duties well done. Paraphrasing John Ruskin, nineteenth century English social reformer, he noted, "The lives which should be written for the benefit of future generation are not necessarily those of the great men who loomed large in the public affairs of any time, but, rather, the lives of inconspicuous persons who do the world’s work--without the doing of which all would revert again to chaos and black night." 18

In visiting Scotland he saw its people to be struggling economically like the rest of the postwar world. The laboring women, for instance, were quite opposed to the unions with the result that there was in Scotland "an inability or unwillingness to work, which is delaying rehabilitation of the business life of the country." He felt that there was a need for genuine religious sentiment for settling the problems of society and of the world, as the history of Scotland had heretofore revealed. His own Scots Presbyterian heritage appeared to influence Marshall to make increasingly theological interpretations of events. 19

Before the trip across the Channel to the Continent Thomas and Lois Marshall in London drove through Petticoat lane on the edge of White Chapel,
and I became greatly interested in the people who thronged it. . . . It was an enlarged edition of New York's East side. As I emerged from Petticoat lane, I found myself wondering whether it did not contain the virus of bolshevism. . . .

Passing on, I came to the Guildhall. It happened to be the day before Empire day, which is the anniversary of Queen Victoria's birthday. As I entered, a rehearsal was being had of a pageant by selected scholars. . . .

These two scenes, these two peoples, in one city were so unlike each other. The King he compared to the President of the United States. The American people apparently regarded their President similarly. He visited the House of Lords and witnessed the ceremony surrounding the introduction of a newly created peer. He compared this ceremony "with the simple induction of a United States senator into office." The contrast of simplicity with ritual ornateness in government and in religion between his country and Great Britain became a vivid memory to him as he wrote home to America.20

In Lausanne, Switzerland, Marshall penned a glowing image of a multi-ethnic republic: "Happy is that people whose past is secure, whose present is safe and whose future is hopeful." While touring the Swiss country side he found no evidence of decay in "this oldest of modern democracies," anticipating the words of Oswald Spangler published the next year as The Decline of the West. He had only praise for the Swiss: "Recalling the usual fate of nations, one is amazed to find a people as devoted to their government and as loyal to its principles and as zealous for liberty as was William Tell himself. . . . This is the one land where the will of the individual is carefully trained."21
In Rome the Marshalls were received by King Victor Emmanuel. Reflections of the occasion were predictive of the dark future that lay ahead for that ancient land. Marshall wrote,

I have seen Italy's king, with his shrewd, hawklike face, speaking perfect English and manifestly deeply interested in the welfare of his people. I met some of the young fascisti and learned the motive of their seemingly lawless conduct. They might well be called the Ku Klux Klan of Italy, if they only wore the bizarre disguise. They are young men who have left the army, the sons of tradesmen and others of like social position. They hold that murder and rapine for political purposes should be met by murder and rapine until the lawless grow weary of their conduct. This band of young outlaws has influenced the political institutions of Italy, as statistics will show. . . .

At one time Italy had been allied with enemies of the United States, and yet Italy withdrew from her triple alliance as she saw Germany become an aggressor nation. Such sacrifice as Italy did make in the Great War ought to be grounds, Marshall was persuaded, for a deeper friendship between the United States and Roma immortalis. Mussolini, however, had other plans with his Fasci del Combattimento. 22

The Austrian postwar condition appeared hopeless. She had been stripped of the glory of her past by the treaty of St. Germain. Austria was left, in the words of British diplomat Harold Nicholson, "a pathetic relic." Her large German-speaking population was practically all that existed of the once multinational entity that had been the Dual Monarchy. Marshall felt that a cruel vengeance had been taken on the Austrian people, but he offered no solution to her crisis. 23
A great delight of the American couple was viewing the world-famous Passion Play at Oberammergau in Bavaria, Germany. For nearly three hundred years that small village had produced once every ten years a moving theatrical portrayal of the last week of the life of Christ. Tourists heard that the townspeople had made their own covenant to produce that play "in response to a miraculous deliverance from a plague against which they prayed," and their descendants had been faithful to their oath. One other notable was in attendance, and Marshall barely mentioned him: "Gen. the Count von Ludendorff." One of the top military leaders of Imperial Germany, Erich von Ludendorff left his fatherland in disgrace at the conclusion of the War but returned to engage in extremist activities, ultimately to align himself with Hitler's abortive coup in November 1923.24

The visit of the Marshalls was no different from most tours that Americans were making on the continent after the war. The difference was in the man, who he was, what he had been through by virtue of his office, and what he was interpreting to the people at home. His opinion of Germany was one of academic respect. His contact with Count Johann von Bernstorff, German Ambassador to the United States, prior to that nation's entry into war and his subsequent recall, was friendly enough. Marshall saw through the diplomatic facade a man who was trained to believe without question that his country was right whether he knew the truth or not. One year before, the Vice President had written on the French indecision on the fate of Wilhelm Hohenzollern, ex-Kaiser of Germany. He believed that the German emperor should have been brought to trial. In words reminiscent of the moral dilemma surrounding Andersonville and later Nuremberg and My Lai, Marshall wrote boldly, "How can it be argued that I should be responsible if I kill my neighbor, but that I should go scot free if I kill a million men?" 25
Even before he left the United States for Europe, Marshall perceived that the French people were fearful lest Germany rearm and that Germany was afraid that France might invade her once British and American troops were withdrawn from the Rhine. France, he had come to believe, assented to the Versailles Treaty because of a promise of military assistance made by the United States and Great Britain in event of danger from the Germans—a new triple alliance, which might have the effect of the Monroe Doctrine and preserve peace in Europe.26

The elder statesman, in Germany, could see the consequences of a nation disrupted by devastation. Its people felt disinherited by what had transpired within the last five years, and some there were who were exerting every effort to help their people understand why life had become so sour. One passage from his remembrance of Germany is noteworthy:

I had just finished reading...when the gentleman who was acting as my interpreter came in and informed me that he had been listening to an impassioned German orator addressing an audience of several thousand persons, all of whom, he said, cheered his statements to the echo. And this is what they applauded as he was epitomized by my interpreter: That the terms of the treaty of peace were an outrage and a disgrace to modern civilization; that no people had ever been so maligned, abused, misrepresented and lied about as had the German people with reference to the inception of the great war; that history had been falsified and that a deliberate and perhaps a successful attempt had been made to prejudice the world against the Germans; that they had always desired peace; that they had entertained no enmity nor ill will against any nation on earth; that France and Belgium had deliberately begun the war; that France had sent her army in Belgium and the Belgians and the French had entered German territory from Aix before the German government made any move toward war; that the war had been one of self-defense, and finally, that right-thinking men ought now to demand that the indemnity be reduced to such terms as would not permanently impoverish the German people.
When he first heard the summary of the German's speech to the crowds, Marshall did not think that the audience would take the demagogue seriously. He discovered in fact that the people were listening and were agreeing, and he concluded that until such time as Germany agrees that she was in fact the aggressor and was responsible for the war, there was no justification for reducing her indemnity to the Allies.27

This extremely vivid picture that Marshall sketched of the thinking of some Germans—and the speech of one man—is remarkable in light of the oratory that carried the themes of the National Socialist Party throughout the 1920's. As it turned out, the Germans were not far from the Nazis in their desperation, their disillusionment, and their determination to fight some day to regain what they believed was rightfully theirs.

Not all Germans felt the way those did who cheered the excited speaker. On another day outside his hotel veranda Marshall watched a German peace march go by. He wondered at its effectiveness, for he knew that vast armies were being maintained throughout Europe, that Italy was still eyeing the Fiume, and Yugoslavia was not far from her reach. Being victors, Italy and France appeared to him to be snobbish to other nations. "The flames of war have not been extinguished in Europe," he perceived, for the "danger of conflict still exists."28

In addition to strife and stress in these countries Russia seemed poised at a crossroads. In conversation with Russian refugees and other eastern Europeans Marshall was convinced that the vast majority of Russians were not Bolsheviks, and he looked for the day when democracy would work itself into that country through the efforts of some strong leader who would have the good of the people at heart: "The voice of such a man has not yet been heard. God may raise up a man. The bolsheviki government is
wobbling, and somewhere, surely, there is either a Napoleon or a Washington for Russia. May heaven give to the kind-hearted people, so long the friends of America, a Washington." Events would show that a Napoleon had even then raised his head; Europe had not yet heard of Joseph Stalin.²⁹

IV

Upon his return to America Thomas Marshall continued writing his observations on the men and movements of his age, castigating those he saw as corrupt and praising what he deemed to be still worthy to emulate. He was against those who sought to inflict their way and achieve their prosperity at the expense of other men. He had no use for demagogues (unionist Bill Haywood and socialist Eugene V. Debs) and he despised intimidating associations (the Ku Klux Klan and the White Cappers of Indiana). Yet, he was willing to give any man a chance to prove himself worthy of respect for himself or for his ideas (the programs of the Harding Administration). He did not condemn men because they had money (John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford) or because they had no money and no position (the immigrant and the Negro). He did not believe in the efficacy of an equal distribution of wealth as did the Bolsheviks. He sincerely believed that the situation of unequally distributed wealth in the United States was eminently better than the "fixed wealth" idea espoused by Russia.³⁰
It is understandable if some people called Marshall old-fashioned, because he continually stressed the necessity for Americans to "get back" to the principles on which their country was founded. The issue is a moot question. Progress—or whatever name one gives it—insures that the present is qualitatively different from the past. His position was that "Progress, however much to be desired, is not always wholly good. I would not condemn it for that, but I would like to modify some of the methods that go with it, and substitute humanism for much of its science."  

The man was intellectually thoughtful, however much one may differ with his insight or even his hindsight. He spoke against inconsistent thoughts and uncritical faith in science, religion, or politics. He knew the men of his day did not possess absolute knowledge or wisdom, and he never claimed to. "Not only are the bitter and the sweet strangely intermingled," he once wrote, "but the good and evil are so interwoven that modern life is not an easy thing to lead. We are living in a grand and awful age." he pondered this thought and looked back on his boyhood following "the war between the states," a simpler day. He considered the course his life had taken: he had followed neither his mother's wish for his life's vocation (a clergyman) nor his father's (a physician). He became a lawyer, though he was never exactly certain why; perhaps it was a compromise with his parents. 

The last twenty-five years of his life (he died in 1925) saw great theological rumblings caused by developments in the scientific study of the Bible and by the turbulence of warring nations which similarly shook the theologians. William Jennings Bryan put his reputation on the line in the Scopes trial of 1925, and his personal esteem along with his fundamentalistic religion suffered immeasurably. Marshall never took on
the forces of liberalism as did Bryan. This was not his way. In one of his last articles he spoke of his faith in this way:

I am myself an old-fashioned orthodox Presbyterian. There is not a thing in the Bible that I cannot and do not believe. My conception of God is that of a being omnipotent and omniscient. Therefore there is no fairy tale which He might not have made a reality. I fix no limitation upon the power of God. But if one desires to worship a smaller being, I know no reason for a quarrel upon the subject. If he is casting out devils in His name it is none of my business to forbid him. I have no fear that the church will permanently suffer from any real or apparent scientific research. A falsehood may be successfully left to die from its own inherent weakness; a truth cannot be destroyed or concealed by the mere mumbling of a creed. . . . Danger to the church lies not in scientific research, but in social uplift. It is when the church shall forbid men to cast out devils in His name and drives them to the point of casting them out by education, by health, sanitation and social agencies that its influence is likely to be weakened.33

Marshall never saw Christianity as failing as a cure to the world's ills. The reasons were far too complex for such a simple criticism. Still, he recognized that Christians sometimes got in the way of their faith. Regarding the Christianizing of the Orient, he wrote, "The orient is to be converted to the truths of the Christian religion when the men who say they believe in it get out of the orient and stay out." His tolerance of people with different beliefs and customs (combined with his anti-imperialist sentiment) was exemplified in many ways. In late 1923, Tsao Kum acceded to the Presidency of the Republic of China. A copy acceptance speech was sent to Marshall by a friend in China. After studying the speech, he reacted, "I am convinced from my reading of the address that America may well look even to those countries generally thought to be most backward in civilization for ideas." This openness to the wisdom of non-Western culture was not common in Marshall’s day.34
The death of Woodrow Wilson in February, 1924, removed any Democratic talk about the former President running again. His former Vice President was not beyond consideration, but there were very few who thought of him as viable Presidential timber. On 14 March he had become seventy years old, and the office which had "killed" both Wilson and Harding would have no mercy for Marshall.

Wilson's papers were being collected from all who had had personal and professional relations with him. Edith Bolling Wilson was sending requests for material to the officials of the two Wilson administrations. Marshall contributed nothing new to Mrs. Wilson's search, though the correspondence and business between him and Wilson found its way into the Library of Congress. Marshall himself enjoyed a considerable correspondence, but it was slight in comparison with the vast Wilson correspondence. The Vice President's last letters were from such public figures as Calvin Coolidge, Elihu Root, Helen Keller, Evangeline Booth, French Ambassador Jules Jusserand, and Robert Lansing.

Nine months before he died, Marshall entered the law firm of Merle Walker and John E. Hollett of Indianapolis. His association with the firm was minimal, though he was still active and informed about the Washington scene. Therein lay his value as a legal counselor. Other business ventures were considered by him, but he was too old for younger, more enterprising men.35

For nearly ten years he had been planning in his mind a book of anecdotes and opinions and character sketches, all drawn from his memory ("recollections" he called them) concerning his entire life. Marshall had told Eleanor Roosevelt as long ago as
1915, on a trip west to San Francisco, that he was planning a book. He even knew how its introduction would read:

That the tired businessman, the unsuccessful golfer,

and the lonely husband whose wife is out reforming the world

may find therein a half hour's surcease from sorrow.

When the Recollections (or "Hoosier Salad", the subtitle) was published in the latter part of the year in which Tom Marshall died, the public eagerly searched it to find anything new that had relevance to the Wilson years. The readers were disappointed in this regard, for Marshall never intended his book to be an expose of intrigue and conflicts. The old man simply wanted to share some of his happy and memorable moments: as a boy in Indiana, a lawyer in the courtroom, a governor in the state house, and, finally, an observer in the capitol of the United States.

No one ever regarded the Recollections as great literature or even as particularly helpful memoirs. Both man and manuscript were regarded alike: commonplace yet admittedy attractive. This man who followed in the footsteps of "great" men, governors who became Vice Presidents, never received the judgment of greatness except by those who knew and loved him.

Lois Marshall, the one who was closest and most dear to her husband, was with him when he died, on a Sunday morning in Washington D. C. A strong bout with the flu had weakened his heart but not his spiritual devotion. Just before he died he read to her from the New Testament (Mark, chapter 4):
And if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand. And if a house be divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand.

Sixty-seven years to the day earlier Abraham Lincoln had quoted from this same source, at Springfield, Illinois, on 1 June 1858.

Many adoring words were spoken about the man from Indiana, words from the lips of those who knew him barely but dearly and of those who knew him well but distantly. His widow confided to her pastor, "The spiritual food I received from you the almost ten years I was [in Washington] should have prepared me for anything. I realize too more and more each day what [a] wonderful thing it was to live with a man of true Christian Faith." To an Indianapolis citizen Marshall was one of the unique ones: "Just think of it," he recalled about their encounter, "He a great man and Vice President of the United States, and I just Charley the streetcar conductor, and he treated me as though I were an equal." 36

A New York Post editorial appeared the day after Marshall died. It said, in part, "Thomas Riley Marshall belonged to the old America." That judgment was only partially correct. In so far as Marshall liked to "look back" to the time when Jeffersonian Democracy was highly valued, he was old-fashioned, for the nation's ways and values had changed significantly since the death of Jefferson in 1826. Nevertheless, Thomas R. Marshall's spirit belongs to the America of the present also. His sense of fair-play and fairmindedness; his sense of justice and loyalty; his acceptance of people--as long as they were sincere; his rejection of intimidation, whether it be imperialism, Bolshevism, or "special privilege": all of these are still valued by an America which once-in-awhile
remembers the cigar quip but cannot remember who said it or what it means, and by a young America which has trouble knowing about Woodrow Wilson, let alone his Vice President.
In his 1978 autobiography, *In Search of History*, subtitled "A Personal Adventure", Theodore H. White began his account by noting a disquieting criticism of his past works from students of history who argued, "Good reporters organize facts in 'stories,' but good historians organize lives and episodes in 'arguments.'" Having written about the U.S. military efforts in China during World War II to generating a number of books on American presidential campaigns White ultimately sat down to write about his life as a reporter of news stories. He found himself forced to make sense of the smaller stories by focusing on the broader meaning of American life and culture and his own life as so influenced, and thus influencing what he had written. In a manner of speaking, how does one’s perception of the trees in the woods get affected by one’s view of the forest as a whole? And, where are we in our perceiving?

This study of a man who had been a Vice President during a turbulent period of United States history was first suggested to me by an older friend who had known Mr. Marshall in their hometown of Columbia City, Indiana. There is something very American-sounding about *Columbia City*. Something symbolic. Something almost sacred to the American soul. As a young man learning his history, I knew nothing about Woodrow Wilson’s Vice President. Yet, the subject had appeal. Like Marshall, I was a Hoosier in my origins. Like Marshall, my life was shaped by midwestern values of
respect for others, respect for the laws, respect for myself. Like Marshall, in my formative years I saw America through the microcosm of the Midwest, and it has affected my understanding of life thereafter. But, Tom Marshall--there's something solid sounding about that name--did not remain a provincial as he experienced the intense stresses of the Washington scene during the years 1913 through 1921 and after. He gained wisdom even as he maintained his sense of balance in those turbulent years. He remained true to what he understood to be the virtuous principles of life that he had learned growing up. Theodore H. White saw Opportunity as the gateway for the evolving, successful politician. Tom Marshall's ticket was Principles: he was a man of principles, who furiously maintained them and sought to engender them in the halls of government as well as in the courts. His sense of Opportunity was in the righteousness of his causes, which would lead to victorious conclusion if the people would give their support. He was an idealist. He stood for certain values. Those values still are given lip-service today in tension with the realities of American life.

As a boy Thomas Riley Marshall was full of spirit, filled with curiosity, constantly wondering about people and places and things and how they all fit in the scheme of things. Influenced by his mother in spiritual matters, he was affected and shaped by his physician father to live in a world influenced by men and movements. An eager and intelligent lad, he entered college at age fifteen and a half and learned how to be a spokesman for others in their common causes. He learned how to be a scholar and an orator. Being an advocate was the essence of the practice of law and a foundation for
becoming a practiced politician. His outgoing personality and his ability to spark humorous responses from his listeners would add to his popularity as a public personality.

Marshall was a man who learned lessons from life experiences. One was that the political office-seeker will not likely win unless there is a groundswell of support for him. Another “lesson”, if it can be called that, is that the Democratic political philosophy was to him infinitely superior to that of the Republican Party. Even so, his brand of politics was individualistic, as opposed to organizational control by a party “machine.” His ethical standards would not allow him to be untruthful or dishonest or susceptible to unscrupulous campaign financing. His insistence upon openness in discussing political issues would not allow him to become part of factionalism within the party. He would in time learn that party organization would be instrumental in helping him to win the governorship of Indiana (1909-1913) and the Vice Presidency (1913-1921), though his guardian angel would be none other than a “party boss,” Thomas Taggart of Indianapolis.

Thomas Marshall persistently and consistently emphasized the executive branch as the executor of legislative decisionmaking. He preached this perspective and exercised it as governor and as Vice President. He firmly believed that a governor or a President without legislative restraint could and probably would become an autocrat. As Governor, Thomas Riley Marshall believed in state democracy, not state socialism. Reflecting his Calvinistic upbringing he perceived the state to be a steward of the people’s interests. He was frugal not only in his personal finances but also in the State’s finances. He reduced
the workforce, saving taxpayers money, and he encouraged the legislature to “retire” Indiana’s state debt.

Tom Marshall was a colorful personality, and his size and physical appearance were easy to caricature by political cartoonists. When most people thought about their Governor, they would smile or laugh because he was a naturally funny fellow as well as an honest government official. Marshall liked to tell jokes and often would joke about himself. Taken out of context this humor, these jokes, and his occasional “kidding” about himself would work against him in the hands of political enemies and even some of those who called themselves friends.

Indiana party boss Thomas Taggart, headquartered in that state’s capital city, had his own agendas and vested interests and achieved national prominence by his adroit organizational abilities. His and Marshall’s political philosophies and objectives often clashed, though on the surface in the name of party unity the two men did not openly clash. They were both devout Democrats but they lived in two separate political worlds: Marshall bathed in the ideas of Thomas Jefferson while Taggart, following Andrew Jackson’s methods, took the road of realism. Taggart came up the hard way, as they say, becoming an astute and successful businessman who knew firsthand humanity’s needs and greeds and used them to achieve his and the Party’s goals. Marshall appealed to the highest in men--issues and principles and not personalities and personal goals. Yet, Taggart’s power and influence would be necessary for the advancement of the career of Marshall himself.
Governor Marshall on occasion could be fearless. He was a fatalist and felt his own future to lie beyond his power to control. But, in the real world he was determined by deeply held principles and by his understanding of the American legal system. He was opposed to anything that he regarded as a cancer on the body politic: organized crime, illegal gambling, mob violence, stock swindles, special interests, and so on. In tune with the times Marshall was a “progressive” or reform-minded governor and was so recognized by journalists and by politicians alike. Republicanism for Marshall represented “conservatism”: protection of the party of privilege, of wealth, and of paternalism.

It was one experience to be the leader, the governor, of the State of Indiana. It was quite a new one to be running on a national ticket and as running-mate to the new, nominal head of the Party he had always held so dear. Tom Marshall was now a national public figure, but also he was not the one “calling the shots,” as it were. He was seen by reporters as conservative in some political matters, progressive or forward-looking in others.

In the campaign of 1912 he was, as a matter of course, compared to Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic presidential candidate. Reporters concluded that Wilson and Marshall were indeed compatible compatriots. It was on the campaign trail that Marshall showed his adeptness at extolling the virtues of his party and at attacking the character of the real opposition party: not Taft’s Republicans but Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive
Party. The Indianan revealed an antipathy to those rich but insensitive corporation heads who were more interested in earning a dollar for their stockholders than in paying wages deserving of their workers’ labors. He was so obsessed with maintaining a financial independence from big business supporters of his own campaign that he sought to pay for his own campaign travel expenses. While he could accomplish that as a gubernatorial candidate, he could not divest himself from influential moneyed interests in the Democratic Party. The American people did not seem to mind. Their votes ultimately got him and Woodrow Wilson sent to the national capital.

Tom Marshall, Hoosier humorist as well as Indiana politician, made an initial favorable impression in his early days in Washington. He could poke fun at himself and speak stoically at the same time. He knew his Constitutional limits, and for a man who was a state governor only months earlier and now Vice President, the experience of being an impotent No. 2 Man was strange indeed. Yet, he persevered conscientiously to learn the proper practice of being a parliamentarian and presiding officer of “the most exclusive club in America,” the Senate of the United States. Somehow Marshall was able to separate in his mind and action the two-hats of a legislative figurehead and an executive member of the Administration in power. It was not a role he found emotionally or intellectually satisfying. He found himself torn between loyalty to free-flowing democratic discussion (in the Senate) and loyalty to partisan presidential pronouncement (in the Wilson White House).
Never reticent to express his views on any pertinent subject, Marshall soon found that as Vice President he did not have the luxury of saying exactly what he thought without ascertaining the compatibility of his thinking with that of the President of the United States. Still, he did on occasion express himself forcefully, and for a time, in the early part of his first years in Washington, he found himself knee-deep in public controversy. Not only Republicans but also capitalistic-minded Democrats wondered about the soundness of the Vice Presidential mind.

It was when he made public speeches and expressed his sincerely held views on what he perceived to be legitimate civic issues that he encountered strong reactions. He attacked Carnegie-funded public libraries for their having been provided by predatory profits. He criticized big business for its enjoying growth at the expense of the working men and women. Marshall charged special interests with having acquired wealth “through watered stocks and bonds, through corners on commodities, through corruption of legislatures, through the sale of impure foodstuffs, through wrecking railroads, through all the devices known to man whereby the law is not abrogated but chloroformed!” His audience on this occasion was none other than Democratic “fat-cats.” For this he was called a socialist by some at a time when America was undergoing social, economic, and political reform from the grassroots on up to the top of society. He questioned the ethics of a growing number of lawyers who appeared to put their fees ahead of their clients’ best interests. In all of these topics and more there was the wailing and gnashing of teeth throughout the land by men who felt they were being stabbed in the back by one from so high a position.
Thomas Marshall had strong foreign policy convictions. The Latin-American states he believed should be treated as equals and not as pawns by a bullying President (whether Roosevelt, Taft, or Wilson). He believed that western hemispheric problems should be handled in conjunction with the other American nations, not unilaterally, as in the Mexican crisis of 1916. And, he was appalled by the godless Bolsheviks and also intolerant toward any Americans or immigrants whose loyalty to the United States could be seen as questionable.

As President of the Senate Thomas R. Marshall exerted whatever influence he could possess from the United States Constitution. He guided many a Senate session, moderating discussion, reminding the Senators of the strict Senate rules, and on occasion providing relief of built-up tension by some humorous announcement or witticism. When possible, he cast deciding votes on current issues, such as against a Republican amendment to a bill regarding civil service reform, or voted to support Philippine independence not only because he believed they should be self-governing but also he wanted his country as neutral as possible when facing a potential war in Europe. During the Senate debates on the League of Nations and the Versailles treaty with Germany Marshall did his best as moderator to insure that all voices had opportunity to debate their positions. However, because of the Republican majority (this was in 1919 to the end of the Wilson term), he was ineffectual in aiding Democratic viewpoints and voting.

He may have been seen as a “hail fellow well met” and ready with a good joke or funny observation, but he could also feel deeply and sometimes get downright upset, such
as when in the congressional campaign of 1918, during which time the nation was at war abroad, the President wanted him to be strongly partisan in campaigning and Marshall felt the times needed a unified, nonpartisan election when all should stand for the nation and behind Wilson. He fumed when he learned second-hand that Wilson was going to Europe to the Paris Peace Conferences and thus had not prepared him, the Vice President, to face the press and the responsibilities of his office. He was uncomfortable attending weekly cabinet meetings as stand-in for the absentee President when he, Marshall, was more properly an active part of the legislative branch as presiding officer of the Senate. He was incensed on one occasion by the intransigence of three Senators who by their filibustering prevented passage of a bill that would fund critically needed governmental expenses. He was frustrated that Wilson took such an uncompromising stand on the League of Nations issue when the matter was serious for the nation and all points of view should be expressed in Senate debate. And, he was most heated when those closest to the stricken President communicated not one word about Wilson’s condition nor about how Marshall might be of assistance since he was Vice President of the United States!

Finally, Thomas Riley Marshall was a man of principles and of convictions. He believed that America was a society in which all men should expect equal justice. He took quite literally the doctrines contained in the Declaration of Independence as well as the laws spelled out in the Constitution. He firmly believed in representative democracy and opposed special privileges to any quarter. For all of his convictions and for all of his imperfections Thomas Marshall ended his Washington career virtually universally admired by the Senators of both major parties. He was admired for his abilities, his
handling of difficult situations, and his genuine kindness to all. Many people thought he should have been President Marshall.